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Abstract 
The overall aim of this study was to examine the work environment and the associations with 
safety, and see the relations with occupational accidents and undesired events on board 
industrial and cruise ships. 215 seafarers participated in this quantitative survey study, with a 
response rate of 35%. When conducting the hierarchical block regression analysis separately 
on superiors/officers and subordinates/ratings, the work environment emerged as a predictor 
for safety status (compliance, attitudes and commitment). Several significant differences in 
the beta value between the two groups were also found. When testing the differences in the 
safety status on ships with high and low number of undesired events and accidents, separately 
on the two groups, significant differences emerged only for superiors and officers; Significant 
differences were found in compliance when testing high and low number of undesired events, 
and for high and low number of accidents safety status and compliance emerged significant. 
Without assuming causation, the work environment appears to be a possible alternate and 
indirect way of improving on the safety status on board ships. However, safety status and the 
relations with undesired events and accidents require further investigation before a more 
accurate conclusion can be made. 
 
 
KEYWORDS; Shipping, Work environment, Safety, Job satisfaction, Stress, Goals, Social 
factors, Attitudes, Commitment, Compliance, Undesired events, Accidents  
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Introduction 
The shipping industry faces many challenges, amongst them the increasing regulations, 
environmental demands, increased responsibility, fluctuations and higher demands in 
economy. Much time and resources has long been directed into the research and 
improvements of materials, regulations and efficiency of ships in order to meet these 
demands. This focus can overlook the human factors, and the people can be neglected. And 
with the shipping industry possibly being the most international business in the world, more 
challenges arise, like communication difficulties, non-uniform training and cultural 
differences like religion, attitudes, standards, social hierarchy and interaction. Shipping is one 
of the more dangerous occupations, and trawler fishing and merchant seafarers in the UK rate 
as the top two most hazardous occupations. Compared to the average British workers, British 
fishermen were 52.4 times- and British merchant seafarers were 26.2 times more likely to 
have a fatal accident at work, like drowning, injury, and asphyxiation from poisonous fumes 
(Roberts, 2002). 
People design, operate, maintain, manage and defend hazardous technologies. That is why the 
human factor, not surprisingly, plays the major part in both causing and preventing 
organizational accidents. Surveys show that about 75-96% of marine casualties are fully or 
partially caused by human and organizational errors (Rothblum, 2000). Studies also show that 
human and organizational factors contribute, in one way or another, to: 75% of fires and 
explosions, 75% of allisions, 89-96% of collisions, 79% of towing vessel groundings, and 84-
88% of tanker accidents (Rothblum, 2000). Accidents are not usually caused by a single 
failure of mistake but rather by the convergence of a whole chain of errors where each step 
could have lead to the prevention of the accident. And the initial step is often induced by 
technical failure, human and organizational factors, or a combination of both (Ren, Jenkinson, 
Wang, Xu, & Yang, 2008). This shows the importance of human- and organizational factors 
when trying to create a safer work environment, and has been the subject of much research in 
the last decade.  
Accident within the offshore- and shipping industry can cause severe injury or death to 
personnel, large economical expenditures due to damaged or lost equipment and cargo, and 
severe environmental damage. This potential tragic injury and loss of human lives, and also 
the cost of such accidents to companies and the loss of a company‟s reputation make the 
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industry invest large sums on improving safety. It then becomes important that the initiatives 
taken within the companies have the desired effect. 
Counter-effective safety initiatives 
The offshore industry constantly give regular safety messages, safety training and indications 
of its safety commitment to the employees, but despite much research and improvement in 
safety performance, companies within the oil and gas sector still have problems motivating 
and sustaining a good safety performance amongst employees (Mearns & Reader, 2008). 
Mearns and Reader argue that this is because „safety‟ in itself, is non-motivating. A good 
safety performance usually give no rewards or feedback, however a poor safety performance 
can results in accidents and damages to materials or personnel. These accidents can help keep 
employees motivated in the short term, but in the long run these accidents may be forgotten, 
and the motivation and focus on safety can fade (Mearns & Reader, 2008). A study conducted 
by Mearns, Whitaker and Flin (2003) showed that the constant safety initiatives by offshore 
companies made the employees weary, and actually lowered the impact on the people that the 
safety initiatives was directed at. A qualitative study by Antonsen (2009) on culture and safety 
on offshore supply vessels also showed that seafarers feel that the increasing rules and 
regulations are of great annoyance, and it deprives them of the need for reason. Furthermore 
they also felt that “filling out a lot of forms is not really part of their job as sailors”. Mearns 
and Reader (2008) suggest that improvements in safety performance may perhaps be better 
delivered indirectly, and not just through safety interventions. 
Overview of the study 
The overall purpose of this study is to examine if the work environment could be used as an 
indirect and alternate way of improving safety on board ships – by investigating the work 
environment and its associations to safety status, and to further examine the relations between 
safety status and actual undesired events and accidents on board ships. The first article 
examines the associations between the work environment and safety status on board industrial 
and cruise ships. The second article investigates the safety status on board industrial ships and 
its relations to recorded undesired events and accidents. 
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Theoretical background 
Safety culture and safety climate 
There is a mix of different constructs created to operationalize safety in order to understand 
and measure it. Safety culture and safety climate is mostly considered as a high priority for 
companies, and is often the subject of audits, improvement initiatives and is often considered 
as a performance measurement. However, the definition and usage of safety culture and safety 
climate constructs vary. In an article by Guldenmund (2000) he gives an abundance of 
definitions, proposed by different researchers, of safety culture and safety climate in which all 
vary in theoretical and practical use. He states that the researchers often define and 
operationalize safety culture or climate to best suit the purpose of their study, and that most 
researchers has not yet gone beyond the stage of face validity, and considers the construct to 
be in the first development stages. There are also different views on whether safety climate 
and safety culture can be considered separate or part of the same construct, and also, if 
separate constructs, whether safety culture precedes safety climate or vice versa. For example 
Schein (2004) sees climate preceding culture, where he argues that climate is culture in the 
making. Many articles have attempted to create new and better models, to systematize the 
great quantity of research on the constructs or to guide researchers to where the next step 
should be (ex: Choudhry, Fang, & Mohamed, 2007; Cooper, 2000; Diaz & Cabrera, 1997; 
Fernandez-Muniz, Montes-Peon, & Vazquez-Ordas, 2007; Glendon & Stanton, 2000; 
Guldenmund, 2000; Hale, 2000; Sørensen, 2002). And many researchers emphasize the need 
for a better construct (ex: Guldenmund, 2000; J. I. Håvold & Nesset, 2009; Reason, 1998).  
There is however some consensus in the literature on which base factors should be included in 
these measurements of safety, but there are usually variations when the concepts are being 
used.  
Safety culture 
Safety culture as a term saw its first light in 1987 in the OECD Nuclear Agency Report on the 
Chernobyl disaster in 1986, and has since been a loose description of corporate culture where 
safety is understood to be the number one priority (Cooper, 2000). In 1993The UK‟s Health 
and Safety commission proposed, according to Håvold (2003), the most comprehensive, 
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explicit and probably most used definition of safety culture; 
 “The safety culture of an organization is the product of individual and group values, 
 attitudes, competencies, and patterns of behavior that determine the commitment to, 
 and the style of proficiency of, an organization‟s health and safety programs. 
 Organizations with a positive safety culture are characterized by communication 
 founded on mutual trust, by shared perceptions of importance of safety, and by 
 confidence in efficacy of preventive measures”.  
This states that the safety culture is the beliefs, values, attitudes, and patterns of behavior that 
a group of people share with respect to safety. Safety climate has been used as a construct to 
measure safety culture, where safety climate is often defined as the „visible‟ part of the safety 
culture. 
Safety climate 
The first study on safety climate as a construct was done at an automotive plant in 1951 by 
Keenan, Kerr and Sherman (Guldenmund, 2000), and has in 60 years not yet reached a 
maturity where one measurement approach or definition is commonly preferred by 
researchers. However, variables in the definitions of safety climate have consistently featured 
either employee‟s attitudes or perceptions of safety, and that is what Guldenmund (2000) calls 
safety climate in his article. He states that attitude theorists can see safety culture as what 
underlies these attitudes and beliefs. Zohar (2000) has proposed what has become the most 
commonly used definition of safety climate; 
 “Essentially climate perceptions relate to „procedures as patterns‟, whereby 
 consistent procedures represent patterns that reflect the importance and prioritization 
 of safety over competing goals”. 
Using these definitions, it would be possible to improve the safety culture or climate by 
modifying the employees‟ beliefs, values, attitudes, and patterns of behavior. Many studies 
has focused on the safety culture and climate in relation to safety performance, specifically if 
improving the safety culture or climate leads to less unsafe behavior and accidents. 
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Relationship between the safety climate, safety performance and accident rates 
If safety culture and climate consists of employee‟s attitudes and beliefs, it could also affect 
employee behavior. One can then argue that a positive safety climate will induce safe 
behavior from the employee‟s where employees are less likely to exhibit unsafe behavior, not 
take unnecessary risks, and comply with rules and regulations (Clarke, 2006b; Lund & Aarø, 
2004; Seo, 2005), which according to Reason (1990) is the forerunner or accident 
involvement. 
A model of safety performance has been proposed by Griffin and Neal (2000), where safety 
performance is divided into three parts; organizational and safety climate as performance 
antecedents, safety knowledge and safety motivation as determinants of performance, and 
performance components. Compliance and participation was incorporated as safety 
performance components, where high compliance and participation is shown by complying 
with safety procedures and carrying out work in a safe manner, helping co-workers, 
promoting the safety program within the workplace, demonstrating initiative, and putting 
effort into improving safety in the workplace. Later analysis of the model found safety climate 
to predict safety knowledge and safety motivation, which in turn predicted safety compliance 
and safety participation. Showing that safety climate predicts safety performance, and is 
mediated by safety knowledge and safety motivation (Neal, Griffin, & Hart, 2000). This 
relationship has been supported in later studies where the perceived safety climate is found to 
predict employee‟s safety behavior (Clarke, 2006b; Garcia, Boix, & Canosa, 2004; Seo, 
2005). The safety climate has also been found to be significantly correlated with self-reported 
accident rates (Vinodkumar & Bhasi, 2009).  
As mentioned, Reason (1990) describes unsafe behavior as the forerunner of accident 
involvement. He classifies unsafe behavior as intended or unintended actions, where the latter 
is defined as slips or lapses. Intended unsafe actions are governed more by attitudes and 
compliance, and he classifies these acts as mistakes (rule-based mistake or knowledge based 
mistake) and violations (routine violation or acts of sabotage). Studies investigating behavior 
and accident rates have found evidence to support this connection. Mearns, Flin, Gordon and 
Fleming (2001) found unsafe behavior to be the best predictor for accidents and near-misses. 
This is further supported in a later study where risk of injury and accident rates has been 
found to be associated with higher levels of stress and poor safety behavior (Glasscock, 
Rasmussen, Carstensen, & Hansen, 2006). 
20 
 
Improving the safety climate 
In order to improve the safety climate it is important to understand what contributes to unsafe 
attitudes and behavior. Many studies link safety to different parts of the work environment, 
with much research done on stress and fatigue and their effects on safety. With a growing 
consensus that the cultural context of work practice may influence safety just as much as 
technology and formal organization structure (Antonsen, 2009), recent studies has also begun 
focusing on safety related to the psychosocial aspects of the work environment. For example 
studies on social support, openness amongst co-workers, feedback from superiors, and 
reciprocal theory through safety citizenship behavior, perceived organizational support, and 
mental contracts (ex: Clarke, 2006a; Coyle-Shapiro & Conway, 2005; Didla, Mearns, & Flin, 
2009; Eisenberger, Stinglhamber, Vandenberghe, Sucharski, & Rhoades, 2002; Rhoades & 
Eisenberger, 2002). Investigating the work environment could potentially lead to sources for 
further improvement in safety, and new kind of initiatives could spark a fresh way of 
motivating employees to create a safer work environment.  
Work environment and safety 
The work environment has been used as a predictor for different safety measures, and safety 
performance is most often used in the form of number of accidents, near-accidents, and 
undesired events. As stated above, attitudes towards safety is thought to affect safety related 
behavior, which in turn affect safety performance. Studies using this concept as measure 
could therefore give indications of work environments factors associated with the safety 
climate. 
The work environment in relation to safety performance 
In a review study, Shannon, Mayr and Haines (1997) investigated the relationship between 
organizational- and workplace factors and injury rates, and identified ten studies eligible for 
review. Four of those studies used work environment factors of interest to this paper (Cohen, 
Smith, & Cohen, 1975; Habeck, Leahy, Hunt, Chan, & Welch, 1991; Shannon, Walters, 
Lewchuk, Richardson, Moran, Haines, & Verma, 1996; Tuohy, & Simard, 1993; in Shannon, 
et al., 1997). Amongst other findings; good relations between management and workers, 
company committing resources to employee health, and the relative importance of safety 
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versus production were found to be related to lower injury rates. In addition, age and marital 
status where also found to be related to lower injury rates. Education/literacy however did not 
show any significant relations to injury rates. 
Different types of stress have been some of the most researched work environment factors in 
relation to safety. Ergonomic stress has been investigated by Melamed (1989, in Lawton & 
Parker, 1998) who ran a study on Israeli workers and found ergonomic stress level (body 
motion and posture, physical effort, active hazards and environmental stressors) where 
predictors of accident involvement. They argue that this preoccupation may serve as a 
distracting factor making the worker less attentive to danger. One could pose a similar 
argument for stress derived from the physical workload or perceived work pressure, and in a 
study by Frone (1998) adolescents with heavier workloads were more likely to have reported 
a workplace accident. Another stress indicator is role overload, which has been defined as the 
degree to which role performance is seen as being affected by inadequate time, training, and 
resources – and has been found to be associated with unsafe behavior by Hofmann and Stetzer 
(1996). The effects of role overload, work pressure and work load upon safety can also be 
explained as the workers desire to use shortcuts in order to deal with the amount of work, 
thereby skipping or hastening safety procedures. 
Stress offshore has been investigated by Rundmo (1995) who found Norwegian offshore 
workers with high job stress along with high levels of perceived risk and dissatisfaction with 
safety measures to significantly predict involvement in accidents and near-accidents. A later 
study by Mearns, Flin, Gordon, and Fleming (2001) with offshore personnel in the UK on 
human and organizational factors in offshore safety, found results that indicate perceived 
pressure for production is the main driver for predicting unsafe behavior. 
Recent studies have also begun focusing on psychosocial aspects of the work environment, 
and the quality of communication and relationship amongst employees and with management 
has been found to be associated with safety. A recent qualitative study by Antonsen (2009), 
mentioned earlier, showed that a sense of solidarity and community like the feeling of „being 
on the same boat‟, where the crew seem to foster a climate for care and open communication, 
give effects that are regarded as positive in terms of safety within an organization.  
A study by Rundmo (1994) on offshore workers, found social support from management to be 
associated with lower injury rates. Høivik, Baste, Brandsdal, and Moen (2007) conducted a 
study in a Norwegian petroleum company and found perception of nearest manager and 
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confidence in management both had a significant correlation of -.26 and -.30 respectively with 
the total of recorded injuries, serious accidents, undesirable incidents, and sickness absence. 
This is further supported in a study by Hofman and Morgeson (1999) where the quality of the 
relationship between leaders and employees were found to be an important predictor of safety 
behavior, and indirectly to the number of accidents.  
Mearns, Rundmo, Gordon and Fleming (2004) found, in a study on psychosocial and 
organizational factors in offshore safety, that accident involvement could be improved by 
attention to safety measures directed at personnel, improving communication and influence, 
attending to workers concern about hazards to the installation. And also have installation 
management cultivate a culture in which safety goals are given precedence over production, 
and people are encouraged to rely on others, as well as themselves in order to detect errors 
and resolve safety problems before they grow into something more serious. 
One can argue that all of the above factors contribute to general employee attitudes towards 
the company and the work – and that job satisfaction therefore would also be associated with 
safety. However, different results have been found regarding job satisfaction. A study by 
Holcom, Lehman and Simpson (1993) found that employees which had experienced accidents 
at the workplace had been described as being unsatisfied with their jobs. This is further 
supported by a later study which found job satisfaction to be positive associated with the 
safety climate (Kath, Magley, & Marmet, 2010), were the safety climate was found to predict 
job satisfaction. But Lawton and Parker (1998) showed in a review study, that job 
dissatisfaction did not predict accident liability but it was related to the probability of excess 
time off and of developing a neurotic complication after an accident. Job satisfaction has also 
been incorporated into safety climate, and a distinction between measurements of safety 
climate and work environment is not always possible. Håvold (2003) has done a review of 
different safety climate scales, and some of these scales incorporate job satisfaction. He 
argues that employees who are satisfied with their job will care about the quality of their 
work, and be more committed to the organization. This study uses commitment, along with 
safety compliance and safety attitudes as a measure for safety status. These constructs can be 
considered as visible parts of the safety culture (safety climate), and there are studies linking 
work environment to safety climate. 
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The work environment in relation to safety climate 
Job insecurity has been found to give attitudinal reactions in employees, and lead to decreased 
organizational commitment, intentions to quit, and reduced satisfaction (Ashford, Lee, & 
Bobko, 1989). A later study by Probst (2001) support this and showed that a high feeling of 
job insecurity lead to a decrease in safety motivation, compliance, and job dissatisfaction. 
Most of the research into safety attitudes, compliance and commitment is focused on 
psychosocial aspects of the work environment. A study by Mearns and Flin (1995) on 
offshore oil and gas industry in the UK, show employee attitudes to safety is underpinned by a 
supportive environment, along with overt management commitment, personal need for safety, 
personal appreciation of risk, attributions of blame, and conflict and control. The same year 
Mearns and Flin (1995) presented, at an Economic & Social Research Council conference, a 
model of accident causation where attitudes to risk is affected by job satisfaction, safety 
satisfaction, management commitment to safety, and co-workers commitment to safety. A 
later study by Parker, Axtell and Turner (Parker, Axtell, & Turner, 2001) found a connection 
between the quality of communication and self-reported safe working. They argue that open 
communication about general work aspects might enhance safety by promoting organizational 
commitment. 
One of the main focuses of high risk industries is to improve employee compliance with rules 
and procedures. Safety compliance is the employee‟s willingness to follow rules, procedures, 
and regulations established by the organization in order to create a safer work environment, 
prevent accidents and have been a high priority in high-risk industries (Neal, et al., 2000). 
When an employee does not comply with these rules, their actions can be defined as an error 
or a violation. Reason (1990) defines a violation as a deliberate deviation from those practices 
deemed necessary in order to maintain the safe operations of a potentially hazardous system. 
Violations of rules and procedures have been found to be a significant contributor of 
accidents. Lawton (1998) gives possible explanations for this link; some violations 
circumvent one layer of defense (rules and procedures) and can make the environment less 
forgiving to errors, and additionally can take employees into new unpracticed situations. 
According to Battmann and Klumb (1993) one can see compliance as behavioral economics. 
They state that behavioral economics is where the study of violations should be seen in a 
social context, and that the presence of violations is dependent of an organizations‟ social 
force, the existing safety culture, shared beliefs, attitudes, norms and practice. They suggest 
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that the decision to violate rules or procedures depends on if the perceived cost for complying 
outweighs the perceived benefits of not complying. In their study they find evidence 
suggesting that groups of employees develop their own internal work procedures that can 
deviate from the external and official rules, and they conclude that increasing feedback and 
unifying behavior constraints by the management is one important way to prevent routine 
violations. Lawton (1998) argues that if employees follow all the rules, their efficiency 
worsen, and the management wants to know why. But if rules are broken and an accident 
happen, the employee risk not receiving compensations. Lawton therefore stresses the 
importance of the purpose of the rules. If the purpose of the rules are other than safety, like 
minimize compensation claims and avoid the cost of accidents, the attitudes of the employees 
are affected. In order to try and explain the connection between safety climate and accident 
involvement new concepts has been introduced. Safety citizenship behavior is one such 
concept, and researchers have found correlations of .47-.64 between safety compliance and 
safety citizenship behavior (SCB) (Didla, et al., 2009). 
Safety citizenship behavior and perceived organizational support 
Compared to safety compliance, SCB opens up for the use of an employee‟s discretion. By 
using one‟s judgment the employee is forced to evaluate the situation and make a decision 
towards an action, which is likely to lead to an increase in safety consciousness (Didla, et al., 
2009). However, both SCB and safety compliance is important for a safer work environment 
and Clarke (2006a) has found that both of these lead to a reduction in accidents. SCB is a 
relatively new concept in safety management, demonstrated by employees taking actions like 
helping co-workers, promoting safety programs, demonstrating initiative, and suggesting 
changes for improving safety. Similar constructs to safety citizenship behavior has been found 
to have an effect on safety performance, and Didla (2009) see SCB as a potentially important 
aspect of reducing risk, and should be focused on. 
In a study by Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Paine and Bachrach (2000) job satisfaction, 
organizational commitment, and supervisor fairness were found to be great motivators for 
citizenship behavior. A later study by Mearns and Reader (2008) showed perceived supervisor 
support for health, and support from the organization predicted more SCB behavior, like 
helping colleagues with safety related matters and reporting dangers at work. They also 
investigated the relationship between SCB and perceived organizational support (POS) and 
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found evidence that by focusing on activities that are designed to improve health, 
organizations can get benefits not just in health but also in safety performance. 
POS is the employees‟ beliefs about an organization‟s support, commitment and care towards 
them (K. Mearns & Reader, 2008). In a study by Eisenberger, Fasolo and Davis-LeMastro 
(1990) a reciprocal commitment to the organization was found with POS being positively 
related to conscientiousness in carrying out conventional job responsibilities,  the expressed 
affective and calculative involvements in the organization, and innovation on behalf of the 
organization in the absence of anticipated direct reward or personal recognition. Mearns and 
Hope (2005) found that employees showed increased commitment, lower levels of unsafe 
behavior and were more compliant towards rules and regulations when they had a high level 
POS, as a result of the organization‟s commitment towards their health and well being. A later 
study also showed that employees feel an obligation towards the organizations welfare when 
they feel a high level of POS, and hold the belief that good performance will be recognized 
and rewarded by the organization (Rhoades & Eisenberger, 2002).  
Rhoades and Eisenberger (2002) further investigated what helps develop POS and found three 
categories that influence POS; fairness of treatment, supervisor support, and organizational 
rewards and job conditions. POS was strongly related to how reasonable and fair the 
distribution of resources are amongst employees, and the interpersonal treatment in resource 
allocation, how much supervisors value the contributions by employees and their care towards 
employee well being; the organizational reward and recognition of employee efforts, along 
with general working conditions provided by the organization. 
Differences in an organizations sub-culture 
When employees work together they can often form their own sub-culture within an 
organization, with a mutual understanding on how they do things. These sub-cultures can 
evolve in different departments, positions, and levels of management (Clarke, 1999; Harvey et 
al., 2002; Schein, 2004). In a study by Hofstede (1998), in a large Danish insurance company, 
he found three distinct sub-cultures: a professional sub-culture, an administrative sub-culture, 
and a costumer interface sub-culture. Mearns, Flin, Gordon, and Fleming (1998), in a study on 
offshore employees, found evidence suggesting attitudes towards safety, for the permanent 
staff, were influenced by whether they were superiors/officers or not. Håvold (2005) found 
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significant differences between the knowledge of safety protocols, and he argues that this may 
be because superiors have a responsibility for the safety of the employees they supervise. The 
earlier mentioned study by Bjerkan (2010), showed that groups need to be taken into account 
when investigating the effects of safety climate and perceptions of the work environment. As 
superiors and officers are tasked with the responsibility of both the safety of themselves and 
their employees, along with equipment and the ship, one could expect differences to emerge 
in predictors of safety compared to subordinates and ratings. 
Aims of the thesis 
Specific aims of the 1
ST
 article 
The specific aims of the 1
st
 article is to examine the work environment predictors for safety 
status on board industrial and cruise ships, and to investigate the differences between 
superiors/officers and subordinates/ratings. The working model of the study is presented in 
figure 1. The specific questions addressed in this article are as follows: 
1. Does the work environment predict safety status? In accordance with theory presented 
in the first article it is predicted that all factors in the work environment; job 
satisfaction, stress, working conditions, goals, relationship with co-workers, and 
relationship with superiors, will contribute significantly towards explained variance in 
safety status. 
 
2. Do the work environment show the same predictors for both superiors/officers and 
subordinates/ratings? With the differences in work description between 
superiors/officers and subordinates/ratings, along with the theory and findings on 
organizational sub-culture presented, it is expect that the motivation for complying 
with rules and regulations, as well as the reason for attitudes towards those rules and 
regulations and the general commitment to overall safety will differ. It is therefore 
predicted that differences between superiors/officers and subordinates/ratings will be 
found in the degree of explained variance from individual work environment 
variables. 
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Figure 1. Work model of the first article 
Specific aims of the 2
ND
 article 
The specific aims of the 2
nd
 article is to examine the relationship between safety status, 
compliance, attitudes and commitment, and safety performance in the form of number of 
undesired events and accidents. And also to investigate the differences between 
superiors/officers and subordinates/ratings. These questions will be examined: 
 
1. Will an increase in safety related compliance, attitudes and commitment result in less 
undesired events and accidents? According to the theory and presented studies in the 
2
nd
 article, it is expected that safety status will be associated with safety performance. 
It is predicted that: A) Ships with low number of undesired events and accidents will 
score higher on attitudes towards rules and regulations. B) Ships with low number of 
undesired events and accidents is expected to score higher on compliance with rules 
and regulations C) Ships with low number of undesired events and accidents is 
expected to score higher on commitment. 
 
2. Do superiors/officers and subordinates/ratings perceive and report the safety status on 
board ships similarly? With potential differences in organizational sub-cultures, along 
with the differences in job description for superiors/officers and subordinates/ratings 
where the latter do the majority of the labor, it is predicted that there will be 
differences between the two groups in the subjective perception of the safety status on 
board. 
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Method 
Samples and procedures 
The two shipping companies were recruited with the help of Det Norske Veritas. Due to the 
remote locations of the ships and also the limited internet accessibility, the questionnaire was 
designed in Microsoft Excel in order to survey data from multiple respondents before being 
sent back. The questionnaire was sent by e-mail to the captains of 24 ships, selected by the 
shipping companies‟ management to participate in the survey. All ships were either in lay-up 
or in transit. When everyone wanting to participate in the study had been given the 
opportunity to do so, the questionnaire was returned. Everyone on the ship was invited to 
participate in the survey, and given information that the study were voluntary, all information 
would be kept anonymous, confidential and no individual answers would be relayed to the 
shipping company. The participants were also informed that a summary report would be given 
to the shipping company at the conclusion of the study. There were no excluding demographic 
variables. 
Interviews 
Prior to the construction of the questionnaire, a total of 15 interviews were conducted in order 
to gain additional insight into the world of shipping and also to assess the aspects of the work 
environment considered to be important for seafarers. Three interviews were with personnel at 
Det Norske Veritas, four with key management personnel at the two shipping companies, and 
eight interviews were conducted with seafarers on board ships. The interview were semi-
structured with topics from different aspects of both physical and psychosocial work 
environment like; physical working conditions, social interactions with co-workers and 
superiors, spare time, their relations with the company, and also their opinion on what is 
important for  creating a good work environment. The interviews were analyzed using a 
contextual content analysis, and the informants statements and believes about the work 
environment were used to create the items in the work environment questionnaire. These 
interviews were conducted in collaboration with Marta Lang (2011).  
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Sample 
A total of 215 seafarers from two Norwegian shipping companies, both superiors/officers (n = 
97) and subordinates/ratings (n = 87), in addition to some unspecified (n = 31) participated in 
this study. The response rate was 35%. Almost all respondents were male (94.4%) and most 
had completed College or University (68.8%). The age of the sample were fairly distributed 
with age group 25-29 (20.5%), 30-34 (14.0%) and 50 years or older (20.0%) being most 
populated. The main nationality represented in the sample are Filipino (63.3%) followed by 
Norwegian (21.4%) and Indian (11.6%). Most respondents were married (68.8%) and about 
one third were single (28.8%). The sample has more officers and managers (45.1%) than 
ratings or subordinates (40.5%) and there were some who did not respond (14.4%). Most 
worked on carrier ships (Roll-on-Roll-off 49.8%, Pure-Car-Truck-Carrier 28.4%) and a few 
on passenger ships or cruise ships (11.2%). The sample shows most respondents working on 
deck (41.9%) and engine (33.0%), followed by catering (8.8%) and on the bridge (8.4%) 
In article 2 of this study, only the sample from one of the shipping companies was used due to 
incompatible data on undesired events and accidents, along with the removal of ships with 5 
or less respondents. This reduced sample consisted of 170 respondents distributed on 13 ships 
are relevant for this study. All respondents reported to be male (95.3%), with 8 missing 
(4.7%). The majority of respondents reported to be in the age between 25 and 34 (34.7%), 
followed by 45 years or older (29.4%), between 35 and 44 (20.6%), and 24 years or younger 
(15.3%). The main nationality represented in the sample are Filipino (63.3%) followed by 
Norwegian (21.4%) and Indian (11.6%). The distribution between superiors /officers and 
subordinates/ratings were equal (41.8%) with some missing (16.5%). A little over half of the 
respondents worked on carrier ships (Roll-on-Roll-off 53.5%, Pure-Car-Truck-Carrier 32.9%, 
bulk 4.1%) and a few on passenger ships or cruise ships (2.4%). The sample shows most 
respondents working on deck (41.9%) and engine (33.0%), followed by catering (8.8%), 
bridge (8.4%), assistants, cadets and other (6.1%) with four missing (1.9%). 
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Questionnaire 
The work environment questionnaire was constructed using the results from the contextual 
content analysis from the interviews. Parts of “Det Norske Veritas Insight questionnaire” were 
also added in order to investigate the safety status on board the ships. In the questionnaire 
these items were categorized in seven topics a) My company‟s safety and goals, b) My 
working conditions, c) My relations, d) My superiors and the shipping company, e) Job stress, 
f) My job satisfaction, followed by demographical information in g) About myself. For the 
complete questionnaire see appendix C. The survey was issued in English and created in 
Microsoft Excel in order to collect multiple responses in a single Excel file. The survey took 
about 20-30 minutes to complete. Performing a Principal component analysis with a Promax 
rotation, resulted in seven dimensions with a total of 25 factors. For factor loadings and 
internal consistency consult appendix A. All scales were measured using a five-point likert 
scale, with different types of rating related to the items of topic. The seven dimensions with 
their individual components were; 
Safety status: Compliance – Willingness to comply with existing rules and regulations 
established to create a safer work environment; Attitudes - Attitudes towards checklists, job 
permits and risk assessment; Commitment - Willingness to improve on safety and if leaders 
encourage to report unsafe conditions. Scale: Strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor 
disagree, agree, strongly agree. 
Job satisfaction: Rewards and Benefits - Satisfaction with salary, chances of promotion, 
further education and other benefits. Satisfaction with co-workers - Communication and 
treatment with and by co-workers, and their level of competence. Task - Task satisfaction, use 
of own competence, respect others have for the work, and possibility of variation. 
Meaningfulness - The value of the work, having to do the work of others, the perception and 
meaning in doing tasks given and difficulties in performing tasks due to rules and regulations. 
Feeling of safety - Job security and trust in co-workers handling of a crisis. Worry - 
Deadlines, amount of paperwork and quality of sleep. Scale: Strongly disagree, disagree, 
neither agree nor disagree, agree, strongly agree – and: very unsatisfied, unsatisfied, neither 
satisfied nor unsatisfied, satisfied, very satisfied. 
Stress: Responsibility and decisions - The burden of responsibility and the pressure of making 
decisions. Work Strain - Amount and pace of work, interruptions and operating hours. 
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Physical nuisance - The effect of temperature, vibrations and noise from the ship. High risk 
tasks - Concern about injuring co-workers and causing financial loss for the company. 
Isolation - The feeling of isolation, contact with family friends and information about the 
world outside the ship. Variation - The variation in the work. Scale: very often or always, 
often, sometimes, seldom, very seldom or never. 
Working conditions: Monetary loyalty - Monetary reason for having this job. Loyalty and 
Goodwill - Loyalty towards the shipping company and willingness to "go the extra mile". 
Intent to leave - Motivation to stay in the company. Scale: Strongly disagree, disagree, neither 
agree nor disagree, agree, strongly agree. 
Company goals: Feeling cared for - The feeling that the company sees the workers as people 
and cares for their well-being, worker's perception of the company's goals eg: profits vs. 
safety and worker's requests for equipment. Scale: Strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree 
nor disagree, agree, strongly agree. 
Relationship with co-workers: Openness towards co-workers - If workers regard co-workers 
as friends, welcomes new people, takes the time to listen if someone needs to talk, and if 
praise others when they've done a good job. Social grouping - If workers only socialize, and 
like to socialize with people from their own department. Openness towards cross-gendered 
work environment - If workers are comfortable or expecting problems when working with the 
opposite gender. Emotional involvement in co-workers problems – Caring and taking notice 
on mood and feeling of co-workers shown by conversing about private affairs, friends and 
family. Scale: Strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree, strongly agree. 
Relationship with superiors: Commitment - If they seem to take their job and responsibilities 
seriously, are perceived as good role models, makes ratings feel appreciated and cared for, 
and takes comments and suggestions seriously. Trust - Trust given and received from 
superiors, availability when needed, and the level of comfort asking for clarification or 
instructions. Scale: Strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree, strongly 
agree. 
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Statistical analysis 
Statistical analyses were performed using SPSS 17.0 (Statistical Package for the Social 
Sciences), with the level of significance set to p < .05. The questionnaire was tested for 
internal reliability, and cronbach‟s alpha and average inter-item correlation was calculated.  
In order to test the predictive power of the work environment with safety status as the 
criterion variable, a hierarchical block regression was performed on the entire sample using 
Safety status as criterion variable. Job satisfaction was added in the first block, as it is thought 
to be the general over all attitudes produced by the work environment, and is affected by the 
other work environment variables in the analysis. Stress and working conditions were added 
in the second block, followed by goals, relationship with co-workers and relationship with 
superiors. Demographical variables age, nationality, relationship status and general education 
were added in the fourth block. To test the differences in work environment predictors 
between superiors/officers and subordinates/ratings, the same analysis were conducted 
separately on the two groups. In addition, t-tests were conducted in order to examine if there 
were significant differences between the predictors for superior/officers and 
subordinates/ratings in the regression analysis. The formula used can be found in Howell 
(2002), and is shown below: 
  
     
    
     
 
 
In order to explore the difference in predictors of the three safety factors (Compliance, 
Attitudes, Commitment) for superiors/officers and subordinates/ratings, a stepwise regression 
analysis were conducted. The graphical presentation (stacked bar chart) is calculated using the 
following formula: 
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When checking for  multi-collinearity, none of the correlations between predictor variables 
were above .6 as recommended by Skog (2005). According to Field (2009) a VIF larger than 
10 and a tolerance lower than .3 is an indicator of multi-collinearity, and Brace, Kemp, and 
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Snelgar (2003) use a tolerance above .1 as a criteria for being acceptable. All models were 
found to be acceptable. 
To examine the associations between safety status and undesired events and accident, a 
correlation analysis were conducted. Ships were also grouped by high and low number of 
undesired events and accidents and t-tests were performed in order to examine any differences 
in safety status between the two groups. 
Results 
Results from the 1
ST
 article 
The first aim of this article was to examine the work environment as a predictor for safety 
status. Hierarchical block regression analysis showed the model explained a large amount of 
variance (62%) in safety status. Satisfaction with co-workers, feeling of safety, goodwill 
towards the company, openness towards co-workers, and commitment from superiors were 
significant predictors of safety status. 
The second aim of the study were to investigate any differences between superiors/officers 
and subordinates/ratings. When performing the analysis on superiors/officers and 
subordinates/ratings an even higher amount of explained variation emerged explaining 78% 
and 73% respectively. Different pattern in predictors were also revealed, with few predictors 
turning out to be significant for both groups, except for feeling of safety. For superiors and 
officers, satisfaction with co-workers, feeling of safety, attitudes towards working with the 
opposite gender, and commitment from superiors were significant predictors. For 
subordinates and ratings, Worry, feeling of safety, monetary loyalty, goodwill towards the 
company, and openness towards co-workers were significant predictors of safety status. 
Testing the differences between the predictors for the two groups revealed showed five 
variables significantly different: Working with the opposite gender, and trust in superiors had 
significantly more predictive power for superiors and officers, whilst worry, work strain, and 
monetary loyalty had significantly more predictive power for subordinates and ratings. 
The results supported the two predictions in the article. The work environment was found to 
be strongly associated with safety status for seafarers in both superiors/officers and 
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subordinates/ratings. Results also show differences in the two groups, indicating that sub-
cultures need to be taken into account when investigating or attempting to create initiatives 
directed at improvements of safety status through the work environment. 
Results from the 2
ND
 article 
The first aim of the second article was to investigate the relations between undesired events 
and accidents, and safety status. The results from comparing ships with high and low number 
of undesired events showed superiors and officers constantly rating ships with high number of 
undesired events as higher on all safety factors, except for commitment which were rated as 
the same on both ships. Only compliance, however, turned out to be significantly higher. 
Subordinates and ratings rate attitudes and commitment higher on ships with low number of 
undesired events, and rate compliance higher on ships with low number of undesired events, 
but none of them were significant. Comparing ships with high and low number of accidents, 
the results seem to somewhat mirror those of undesired events and accidents. Superiors and 
officers rate all safety factors as higher on ships with high number of accidents, with over all 
safety status and compliance being significant. Subordinates and ratings rate all safety factors 
higher on ships with low number of accidents except for attitudes, but again; none of the 
differences were significant. The results contradict the predictions that ships with low number 
of undesired events and accident would be rates significantly higher on compliance, attitudes 
and commitment.  
Partial support were found for the second aim of the study; to investigate differences between 
superiors/officers and subordinates/ratings. Interesting differences between superiors/officers 
and subordinates/ratings were found in their perception of compliance, attitudes and 
commitment. Results could indicate subordinates and ratings having a more accurate 
depiction of safety status on board the ships, and it could be that future safety culture 
assessments should primarily focus on this group in order to get the most accurate 
measurement. Further examination is however required before any conclusion can be made. 
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Discussion 
The overall purpose of this study was to investigate alternate ways of improving safety on 
board ships. The first step (article 1) was to investigate the work environment as predictor for 
safety status. The second step (article 2) was to examine the associations between safety status 
and undesired events and accidents. Differences in sub-culture between superiors/officers and 
subordinates/ratings were also investigated. A comprehensive discussion on the results is 
found in the articles.  
Overall, the seafarers in this study seem to be content with the perceived work environment 
on board the ships in this study. The majority of scores rated the work environment variables 
from neutral to high; although there are variations and some seafarers also rated some 
variables at the lowest possible score. Likewise, the safety status on board the ships was 
mostly rated neutral to high. 
In article 1, significant predictors for the entire, were in support of much of the presented 
theory. High satisfaction with co-workers and openness with co-workers were significant 
predictors of better safety status. This is in accordance with earlier findings (Antonsen, 2009; 
Shannon, et al., 1997). This could also relate to SCB, where better satisfaction with the 
workplace would lead to a more caring towards the company and its interests (Håvold & 
Nesset, 2009; Mearns & Reader, 2008). High goodwill towards the company along with 
superiors and officers‟ commitment towards the company and safety where also significant 
predictors of better safety status, which is also in accordance with earlier findings (Hofmann 
& Morgeson, 1999; Høivik, et al., 2007; Rundmo, 1994; Shannon, et al., 1997), and SCB 
along with POS (Mearns & Reader, 2008; Rhoades & Eisenberger, 2002). Feeling of safety 
was also a significant predictor of safety status, as found in earlier research (perceived risk; 
Rundmo, 1995) and (job insecurity; Ashford, et al., 1989; Probst & Brubaker, 2001).  
In article 2, the results contradicted most of the presented theory. Only the theories on 
differences in sub-culture were partially supported. The results from ships with high and low 
number of undesired events showed superiors and officers constantly rating ships with high 
number of undesired events as higher on all safety factors, except for commitment which were 
rated as the same on both ships. Only compliance, however, turned out to be significantly 
higher. Subordinates and ratings rate attitudes and commitment higher on ships with low 
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number of undesired events, and rate compliance lower on ships with low number of 
undesired events, but none of them were significant.  
For ships with high and low number of accidents, the results seem to somewhat mirror those 
of undesired events and accidents. Superiors and officers rate all safety factors as higher on 
ships with high number of accidents, with over all safety status and compliance being 
significant. Subordinates and ratings rate all safety factors higher on ships with low number of 
accidents except for attitudes, but again; none of the differences were significant. 
For shipping companies struggling to keep seafarers motivated to maintaining a safe work 
environment, these findings could prove useful. If trying to improve upon the safety on board 
ships through work environment, the results shows that, having superiors and officers that 
care and support their employees, emphasizes the company‟s commitment and prioritization 
of their employees, and ensuring an open and caring environment amongst co-workers, could 
be an indirect way of improving on safety for all seafarers. But the results also show the need 
for separate initiatives; with a focus on building trust between the management and the 
superiors/officers, and ensuring that the subordinates/ratings feel that management and their 
leaders care about them and give them satisfactory salaries. According to the findings 
As presented in the introduction, Mearns and Reader (2008) suggested in their article that 
improvements in safety performance may perhaps be better delivered indirectly, and not just 
through safety interventions. This study has taken one step in the direction of finding work 
environment as an alternate and indirect way of improving on safety on board ships. There are 
however some limitation in the current study that need to be taken into account. 
Methodological limitations 
As some ships and shipping companies tend to have ratings recruited from countries with 
low-salary workforce like the Philippines, and officers from western countries (Norway and 
India in this sample).The differences between superiors/officers and subordinates/ratings may 
have been affected by nationality culture. This could emphasize differences between the two 
groups. National culture has also been found to have an effect on response styles, where one 
nationality group can tend to answer in a specific bias (Silverthorne, 2005).  
National differences in working conditions like salary, contract length, and standards can 
result in differences in expectations and satisfaction with present circumstance. The different 
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types of cargo carried by ships (e.g. containers, cars, chemicals) also pose different kinds of 
dangers, and consequently require different levels of safety measures. Generalizing the results 
across different ship types and other nationalities will therefore be difficult. The size of the 
sample in this study was also not optimal, even though all sampling adequacy-tests were 
satisfactory in both the factor- and regression analyses.  
As always, with self-report surveys, there may be response bias where respondents answer 
what they think is socially desirable. There is also the possibility that the self-reported 
answers do not reflect the actual level of the concept measured.  
The delay between data on undesired events and accidents and the questionnaire data could 
result in the two data sets not being related as closely as they could. There could have been 
initiatives taken on board the ships to improve upon safety, and as this study were unable to 
obtain such data, this could be a confounding variable in the present study. A longitudinal 
study with multiple measurements would be able to examine the associations between 
undesired events, accidents and safety status, more in depth compared to a cross-sectional 
study. 
Causality also needs to be addressed. In this study, causality cannot be derived from analyses, 
as the methods examine relations between variables and not the direction of causes. 
Establishing causality through experimental design is very difficult to achieve in 
organizational research. But indications of causality may perhaps be better derived from 
longitudinal studies. 
Practical applicability 
The practical applicability of this study is at this point in time somewhat limited. No causal 
relationship has been established, as the study aimed to investigate the predictors of safety 
status. Furthermore, the relationship between undesired events and accidents, and safety status 
was inconclusive. The study has however presented a model of the work environment that is 
strongly associated with safety status, and can be used to further investigate the relationship 
between the two. This model is also developed for shipping companies, and may therefore be 
useful for investigating the work environment on board ships. Lastly, the study has shown the 
importance of not considering the entire ship as one culture, but taking sub-cultures into 
account. 
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Future research implications 
Three suggestions are made for future research. Firstly, if investigating predictors of safety or 
the work environment, one should take into account the different sub-cultures that may arise 
within an organization. Secondly, further validation of the questionnaire and safety status with 
larger samples and also in other industries than shipping in order to assess the validity and 
generalization of the results. And lastly, as this is an attempt to investigate alternate and 
indirect ways of improving upon safety, path analysis with the work environment and safety 
status could be performed in an attempt to create a causal model of the relationship. 
Conclusion 
The overall aim of the study, to investigate the work environment as an alternate way of 
improving on safety on board ships, remains inconclusive. The work environment has been 
shown to be strongly associated with safety status, but safety status however could not be 
related to undesired events and accidents. Despite the methodological limitation, this study is 
believed to have made some contributions to the investigation of new ways to improve upon 
safety. This study has identified variables in the work environment that predicts safety status, 
and also works environment variables that predicts compliance, attitudes and commitment 
individually. Significant differences in the predictors between sub-cultures on board ships 
have also been shown, along with the importance of testing the significance levels of such 
differences in order to not overestimate differences that are not there. 
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Abstract 
The aim of the study was to examine the association between the work environment and 
safety status on board ships. A total of 24 ships participated in this quantitative survey study 
with a total of 215 seafarers (97 superiors/officers, 87 subordinates/ratings) leaving a response 
rate of 35.5%. Hierarchical block regression on the entire sample showed satisfaction with co-
workers, feeling of physical safety and job security, goodwill towards the company, openness 
amongst co-workers, and superiors committed to their job and the safety, contributing 
significantly to explained variance in employees‟ safety compliance,  attitudes, and 
commitment. Leaving work environment factors explaining a total of 62% of the variance. 
Differences was found between superiors/officers and subordinates/ratings, where a total of 
78% and 73% of the variance was explained respectively. Attitudes towards working with the 
opposite gender and trust in superiors were more important for superiors/officer, whilst worry 
about work off shift, work strain, and monetary reasons for having the job were more 
important for subordinates/ratings. As expected, the work environment seems to be strongly 
associated with the compliance, attitudes and commitment to safety on board ships. The study 
was conducted in collaboration with Det Norske Veritas (DNV). 
 
KEYWORDS; Shipping, Work environment, Safety, Job satisfaction, Stress, Goals, Social 
factors, Working conditions, Attitudes, Commitment, Compliance. 
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Introduction 
The potential tragic injury and loss of human lives, the cost of accidents, and the loss of 
company‟s reputation make the offshore and shipping industry invest large sums on 
improving safety. Despite much improvement in safety performance, many companies still 
have problems motivating and sustaining a good safety performance amongst employees 
(Mearns & Reader, 2008). Mearns and Reader (2008) argue that this is because „safety‟ in 
itself, is non-motivating. A poor safety performance can result in accidents and damages to 
materials and personnel, whilst a good safety performance usually gives no feedback. 
Accidents can help keep employees motivated in the short term, but as time passed, these 
accidents fade and the focus on safety can fade with it. Mearns, Whitaker and Flin (2003) has 
shown that the constant safety initiatives by offshore companies made the employees weary, 
and actually lowered the impact on the people that the safety initiatives was directed at. 
Mearns and Reader (2008) thus suggest that improvements in safety performance may 
perhaps be better delivered indirectly, and not just through safety interventions. Investigating 
the work environment could potentially lead to sources for further improvement in safety, and 
new kind of initiatives could spark a fresh way of motivating employees to create a safer work 
environment. 
Investigating safety 
There is a mix of different constructs created to operationalize safety in order to understand 
and measure it. Guldenmund (2000) states that the researchers often define and operationalize 
safety culture or climate to best suit the purpose of their study. There is however some 
consensus in the literature on which base factors should be included in these measurements of 
safety, but there are usually variations when the concepts are being used. Safety climate is 
often viewed as the visual part of safety culture, and has consistently featured either 
employee‟s attitudes or perceptions of safety (Guldenmund, 2000). If safety culture and 
climate consists of employee‟s attitudes and beliefs, it could also affect employee behavior. 
One can then argue that a positive safety climate will induce safe behavior from the 
employees where they are less likely to exhibit unsafe behavior, which according to Reason 
(1990) is the forerunner or accident involvement. It has also been found that they will not take 
unnecessary risks, and comply with rules and regulations (Clarke, 2006b; Lund & Aarø, 2004; 
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Seo, 2005). In this study, safety status is used to investigate seafarers‟ perceptions on safety 
on board the ships. Safety status is defined as the self-reported perceived status of safety, 
consisting of the employees‟ perceptions of the attitudes to rules and regulations, along with 
perceived compliance with said rules and regulations and commitment towards overall safety. 
Work environment and safety 
There has been a growing consensus that the cultural context of the work practice may 
influence safety just as much as technology or formal organizations (Antonsen, 2009), and 
studies has begun focusing on safety related to the psychosocial aspects of the work 
environment (ex: Clarke, 2006a; Coyle-Shapiro & Conway, 2005; Didla, Mearns, & Flin, 
2009; Eisenberger, Stinglhamber, Vandenberghe, Sucharski, & Rhoades, 2002; Rhoades & 
Eisenberger, 2002). 
The work environment and associations with safety 
In a review study Shannon, Mayr and Haines (1997) investigated the relationship between 
organizational and workplace factors and injury rates. Amongst other findings; good relations 
between management and workers, company committing resources to employee health, and 
the relative importance of safety versus production were found to be related to lower injury 
rates (Cohen, Smith, & Cohen, 1975; Habeck, Leahy, Hunt, Chan, & Welch, 1991; Shannon, 
Walters, Lewchuk, Richardson, Moran, Haines, & Verma, 1996; Tuohy, & Simard, 1993; in 
Shannon, et al., 1997). In addition, they found that age and marital status were related to 
lower injury rates, but education or literacy did not show any significant relations to injury 
rates. 
Stress 
Different types of stress have been some of the most researched work environment factors in 
relation to safety. Ergonomic stress has been investigated by Melamed (1989, in Lawton & 
Parker, 1998) who ran a study on Israeli workers and found ergonomic stress level (body 
motion and posture, physical effort, active hazards and environmental stressors) were 
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predictors of accident involvement. A study by Frone (1998) found that adolescents with 
heavier workloads were more likely to have reported a workplace accident. Stress has been 
investigated on offshore plattforms by Rundmo (1995), who found Norwegian offshore 
workers with high job stress, along with high levels of perceived risk and dissatisfaction with 
safety measures, significantly predicted involvement in accidents and near-accidents. Stress 
has also been investigated in relation to unsafe behavior, where unsafe behavior was 
associated with role overload (Hofmann & Stetzer, 1996), and perceived pressure for 
production (Mearns, Flin, Gordon, & Fleming, 2001). 
Job satisfaction 
Job satisfaction is a popular topic of research in organizational culture, and has also been 
investigated in association with safety although not all studies find a relation between the two. 
A study by Holcom, Lehman and Simpson (1993) found that employees which had 
experienced accidents at the workplace had been described as being unsatisfied with their 
jobs, but Lawton and Parker (1998) showed in a review study, that job dissatisfaction did not 
predict accident liability. A later study which found the safety climate to be predict job 
satisfaction (Kath, Magley, & Marmet, 2010). Håvold (2003) has done a review of different 
safety climate scales, and some of these scales incorporates job satisfaction. He argues that 
employees who are satisfied with their job will care about the quality of their work, and be 
more committed to the organization. 
Psychosocial variables 
Job insecurity has been found to give attitudinal reactions in employees, and lead to decreased 
organizational commitment, intentions to quit, and reduced satisfaction (Ashford, Lee, & 
Bobko, 1989). Probst (2001) found support for this and showed that a high feeling of job 
insecurity lead to a decrease in safety motivation, compliance, and job satisfaction. 
Much research has also been done on social interaction and communication. A study by 
Rundmo (1994) on offshore workers, found social support from management to be associated 
with lower injury rates. This is further supported in a study by Hofman and Morgeson (1999) 
were the quality of the relationship between leaders and employees were found to be an 
important predictor of safety behavior, and indirectly to the number of accidents. Mearns and 
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Flin (1995), in a study on offshore oil and gas industry in the UK, showed that employee 
attitudes to safety is underpinned by a supportive environment, along with overt management 
commitment, personal need for safety, personal appreciation of risk, attributions of blame, 
and conflict and control. The same year Mearns and Flin (1995) presented, at an Economic & 
Social Research Council conference, a model of accident causation where attitudes to risk is 
affected by job satisfaction, safety satisfaction, management commitment to safety, and co-
workers commitment to safety. A later study by Parker, Axtell and Turner (Parker, Axtell, & 
Turner, 2001) found a connection between the quality of communication and self-reported 
safe working. They argue that open communication about general work aspects might 
enhance safety by promoting organizational commitment. Mearns, Rundmo, Gordon and 
Fleming (2004) found that accident involvement could be improved by attention to safety 
measures directed at personnel. By improving communication and influence, attending to 
workers concern about hazards to the installation, and also have installation management 
cultivate a culture in which safety goals are given precedence over production, and people are 
encouraged to rely on others, as well as themselves in order to detect errors and resolve safety 
problems before they grow into something more serious. And finally, Høivik, Baste, 
Brandsdal, and Moen (2007) conducted a study in a Norwegian petroleum company and 
found perception of nearest manager and confidence in management both had a significant 
correlation of -.26 and -.30 respectively with the total of recorded injuries, serious accidents, 
undesirable incidents, and sickness absence. 
Compliance 
One of the main focuses of high risk industries is to improve employee compliance with rules 
and procedures (Neal, Griffin, & Hart, 2000). When an employee does not comply with these 
rules, their actions can be defined as an error or a violation. Reason (1990) defines a violation 
as a deliberate deviation from those practices deemed necessary in order to maintain the safe 
operations of a potentially hazardous system. Violations of rules and procedures have been 
found to be a significant contributor of accidents (Lawton, 1998). In order to try and explain 
the connection between safety climate and accident involvement new concepts has also been 
introduced. Safety citizenship behavior is one such concept, and researchers have found 
correlations of .47-.64 between safety compliance and safety citizenship behavior (SCB) 
(Didla, et al., 2009). 
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Safety citizenship behavior and perceived organizational support 
Compared to safety compliance, SCB opens up for the use of an employee‟s discretion. By 
using one‟s judgment the employee is forced to evaluate the situation and make a decision 
towards an action, which is likely to lead to an increase in safety consciousness (Didla, et al., 
2009). However, both SCB and safety compliance is considered important for a safer work 
environment, and Clarke (2006a) has found that both of these lead to a reduction in accidents. 
Didla (2009) sees SCB as a potentially important aspect of reducing risk, and states that this 
should be focused on. 
SCB behavior has been found to be predicted by job satisfaction, organizational commitment, 
and supervisor fairness (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Paine, & Bachrach, 2000), along with 
perceived supervisor support for health, and support from the organization (Mearns & Reader, 
2008). Mearns and Reader (2008) also investigated the relationship between SCB and 
Perceived Organizational Support (POS) and found evidence that by focusing on activities 
that are designed to improve health, organizations can get benefits not just in health but also 
in safety performance. 
Perceived Organizational Support 
POS is the employees‟ beliefs about an organization‟s support, commitment and care towards 
them (Mearns & Reader, 2008). High levels of POS has been found to make employees show 
increased commitment, lower levels of unsafe behavior and were more compliant towards 
rules and regulations (Mearns & Hope, 2005), as a result of the organization‟s commitment 
towards their health and well being. A later study also showed that employees feel an 
obligation towards the organizations welfare when they feel a high level of POS (Rhoades & 
Eisenberger, 2002). Rhoades and Eisenberger (2002) further investigated what helps develop 
POS and found three categories that influence POS; fairness of treatment, supervisor support, 
and organizational rewards and job conditions. POS was strongly related to how reasonable 
and fair the distribution of resources are amongst employees, and the interpersonal treatment 
in resource allocation, how much supervisors value the contributions by employees and their 
care towards employee well being; the organizational reward and recognition of employee 
efforts, along with general working conditions provided by the organization. 
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Differences in an organizations sub-culture 
When employees work together they can often form their own sub-culture within an 
organization, with a mutual understanding of how they do things. These sub-cultures can 
evolve in different departments, positions, and levels of management (Clarke, 1999; Harvey et 
al., 2002; Schein, 2004). In a study by Hofstede (1998), in a large Danish insurance company, 
he found three distinct sub-cultures: a professional sub-culture, an administrative sub-culture, 
and a costumer interface sub-culture. Mearns, Flin, Gordon, and Fleming (1998), in a study on 
offshore employees, found evidence suggesting attitudes towards safety, for the permanent 
staff, were influenced by whether they were superiors/officers or not. Håvold (2005) found 
significant differences between the knowledge of safety protocols, and he argues that this may 
be because superiors have a responsibility for the safety of the employees they supervise. The 
earlier mentioned study by Bjerkan (2010) showed that groups need to be taken into account 
when investigating the effects of safety climate and perceptions of the work environment. As 
superiors and officers are tasked with the responsibility of both the safety of themselves and 
their employees, along with equipment and the ship, one could expect differences to emerge 
in predictors of safety compared to subordinates and ratings. 
Aims of the study 
This study examines the predictors for safety climate, measured by safety compliance, 
attitudes and commitment. Presented findings show that many factors in the work 
environment are associated with the safety climate. Job satisfaction (feeling of safety, 
satisfaction with tasks and co-workers, rewards and benefits), Stress (workload, perceived 
work pressure, uncomfortable postures), Working conditions (loyalty and goodwill, intent to 
leave, monetary incentive), Company goals and prioritization of safety and productivity over 
the employees (feeling cared for), Relationship amongst co-workers (openness, support, social 
grouping, emotional involvement), Relationship with superiors (social support and feedback, 
trust, quality of communication) have all been shown to be associated with safety. Either with 
safety performance, or attitudes and behavior in the safety climate. Based on these findings 
the following expectation is made: 
H1: Factors in the work environment will contribute significantly towards explained variance 
in safety status. 
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With the differences in work description between superiors/officers and subordinates/ratings, 
one would expect that the motivation for complying with rules and regulations, as well as the 
reason for attitudes towards those rules and regulations and the general commitment to overall 
safety will differ. It is therefore expected that: 
H2: Differences between superiors/officers and subordinates/ratings will be found in the beta 
value of work environment variables predicting safety status. 
Method 
Sample 
The sample was collected from two Norwegian shipping companies, one industrial shipping 
company, and one cruise ship company – with the help of Det Norske Veritas (DNV). The 
questionnaire was designed in Microsoft Excel in order to survey data from multiple 
respondents before being sent back. The questionnaire was sent by e-mail to the captains of 
24 ships selected, by the shipping companies‟ management, to participate in the survey. All 
ships were either in lay-up or in transit. When everyone wanting to participate in the study 
had been given the opportunity to do so, the questionnaire was returned. Everyone on the ship 
was invited to participate in the survey, and given information that the study were voluntary, 
all information would be kept anonymous, confidential and no individual answers would be 
relayed to the shipping company. The participants were also informed that a summary report 
would be given to the shipping company at the conclusion of the study. 
A total of 215 seafarers completed the questionnaire resulting in a calculated response rate of 
35%. Detailed demographics are shown in table 1. Almost all respondents were male (94.4%) 
and most had completed College or University (68.8%). The age of the sample were fairly 
distributed with age group 25-29 (20.5%), 30-34 (14.0%) and 50 years or older (20.0%) being 
most populated. The main nationality represented in the sample are Filipino (63.3%) followed 
by Norwegian (21.4%) and Indian (11.6%). Most respondents were married (68.8%) and 
about one third were single (28.8%). The sample has more officers and managers (45.1%) 
than ratings or subordinates (40.5%) and there were some who did not respond (14.4%). Most 
worked on carrier ships (Roll-on-Roll-off 49.8%, Pure-Car-Truck-Carrier 28.4%) and a few 
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on passenger ships or cruise ships (11.2%). The sample shows most respondents working on 
deck (41.9%) and engine (33.0%), followed by catering (8.8%) and on the bridge (8.4%). 
 
Table 1: Detailed demographics 
Variable No. Respondents 
(percent) 
 Variable No. Respondents 
(percent) 
Gender   General education  
 
Male 203 (94,4%)  
 
Basic 16 (7,4%) 
 
Female 3 (1,4%)  
 
High School 14 (6,5%) 
 
Missing 9 (4,2%)  
 
Vocation School 34 (15,8%) 
Age   
 
College / Univeristy 148 (68,8%) 
 
20 or younger 12 (5,6%)  
 
Missing 3 (1,4%) 
 
20-24 21 (9,8%)  Tyoe of ship  
 
25-29 44 (20,5%)  
 
PCTC 61 (28,4%) 
 
30-34 30 (14,0%)  
 
Ro-Ro 107 (49,8%) 
 
35-39 25 (11,6%)  
 
Passenger / Cruise 24 (11,2%) 
 
40-44 17 (7,9%)  
 
Other 18 (8,5%) 
 
45-49 23 (10,7%)  
 
Missing 5 (2,3%) 
 
50 or older 43 (20,0%)  Superior or subordinate 
 
Missing 0 (0,0%)  
 
Officer / Manager 97 (45,1%) 
Nationality   
 
Rating / Subordinate 87 (40,5%) 
 
Norwegian 46 (21,4%)  
 
Missing 31 (14,4%) 
 
Filipino 136 (63,3%)  Position  
 
Indian 25 (11,6%)  
 
Deck 90 (41,9%) 
 
Other 7 (3,3%)  
 
Engine 71 (33,0%) 
 
Missing 1 (0,5%)  
 
Ship assistant 1 (0,5%) 
Relationship status  
 
Apprentice/Cadet 8 (3,7%) 
 
Single 62 (28,8%)  
 
Bridge 18 (8,4%) 
 
Married / Living partner 148 (68,8%)  
 
Catering 19 (8,8%) 
 
Divorced 5 (2,3%)  
 
Other 4 (1,9%) 
 
Missing 0  (0,0%)  
 
Missing 4 (1,9%) 
Total 215 (100%)  Total 215 (100%) 
Material 
The questionnaire used in this study was developed for DNV in order to examine the work 
environment on board ships. In order to create the questionnaire a total of 20 interviews were 
conducted. Three interviews with management in two shipping companies and five interviews 
with key personnel at DNV were conducted for background information on the challenges 
within the shipping industry. 12 seafarers were interviewed on board ships to get their views 
on the work environment and life on board a ship to assess challenges, and what is most 
important for achieving a good work environment. These interviews were analyzed using 
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contextual content analysis, and questionnaire items were formulated from statements made 
by informants during the interviews. In addition, a selection of items from the DNV‟s Insight 
questionnaire was added in order to assess safety behavior, attitudes and commitment. See 
appendix A for questionnaire items. The finished questionnaire was reduced to 94 items (89 
scale items and 15 demographic items). 
The questionnaire was created in Microsoft Excel in order to be distributed by e-mail, and can 
hold survey data from multiple respondents. Seven dimensions (Safety status, Job satisfaction, 
Stress, Working conditions, Goals, Relationship with co-workers, and Relationship with 
superiors) were analyzed through exploratory factor analysis, with principal component 
analysis and direct oblimim rotation, and a total of 22 factors were identified. The Kaiser-
Meyer-Olkin (KMO) and Bartlett‟s test of sphericity were both acceptable for all analysis. 
Questionnaire properties 
Safety status is used in this study as an alternative to safety culture and safety climate, as 
these constructs vary in definition and usage. Safety status is here defined as the self-reported 
perceived status of safety, in regards to compliance with rules and regulations, attitudes 
towards said rules and regulations, and commitment to overall safety. The questionnaire 
properties is presented below. 
Internal consistency of the scales is shown in table 2, where the majority was found to have an 
acceptable alpha (α  > .70) (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994), and some were found to be 
adequate (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996); Commitment (α=.57), Worry (α=57), Feeling of safety 
(α=.50), Monetary loyalty (α=.66), Goodwill (α=.56), Intent to leave (α=.55), and Emotional 
involvement (α=.68). These factors all consists of 2-3 items, which can have a negative 
impact on the alpha level. However, all the scales have an acceptable average inter-item 
correlation (r >.30) (Field, 2009), and is therefore included in the analysis. In addition Schmitt 
(1996) states that an alpha ranging as low as .40 can still be meaningful. For items and factor 
loadings see appendix A. 
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Table 2: Internal consistency and average item-total correlation 
      α  
Average inter-
item correlation  Items  
Safety status   .785  .44  12 
 
Compliance  .743  .49  6 
 
Attitudes  .759  .60  3 
 
Commitment   .568  .39  3 
Job satisfaction  
   
 
Rewards and benefits  .827  .63  5 
 
Co-workers   .871  .73  4 
 
Task  .840  .68  4 
 
Meaningfulness   .702  .52  3 
 
Worry  .573  .39  3 
 
Feeling of safety  .501  .34  2 
Stress  
   
 
Resp. & decisions   .810  .63  4 
 
Work strain  .815  .64  4 
 
Physical nuisance   .841  .71  3 
 
High risk tasks  .919  .85  2 
 
Isolation   .797  .66  2 
   Variation   -  -  1 
Working conditions  
   
 
Monetary loyalty  .658  .49  2 
 
Goodwill   .564  .86  2 
 
Intent to leave   .551  .39  2 
Goals  
   
 
Feeling cared for   .768  .51  6 
Relationship with co-workers  
   
 
Openness  .714  .51  4 
 
Social grouping   .770  .63  2 
 
Working with opposite gender  .709  .55  2 
 
Emotional involvement   .683  .52  2 
Relationship with superiors  
   
 
Commitment  .817  .61  5 
 
Trust  .748  .55  4 
N 
 
207-215 
  Likert-scale range 1-5 
   
The inter-dimensional correlations are shown in table 3, and the subscales used in the analysis 
can be found in appendix B. The discriminant validity was found to be satisfactory (low – 
med correlation). All subscales and dimensions had a correlation below .60. 
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Table 3: Pearson‟s correlations between the main factors and safety factors  
 
1 A B C 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Safety status -         
    A. Safety - Compliance .88** -        
    B. Safety - Attitudes .75** .44** -       
    C. Safety - Commitment .55** .34** .18** -      
2. Job satisfaction .50** .54** .30** .14 -     
3. Stress .21** .24** .18* -.05 .42** -    
4. Working conditions .18** .25** .08 -.01 .14* -.08 -   
5. Relationship with co-workers .45** .37** .27** .40** .33** .13 -.02 -  
6. Relationship with superiors 59** .57** .34** .37** .54** .20** .08 .34** - 
n = 185-215 
         * p < .05; ** p < .01 
          
 Statistical Analysis 
Statistical analyses were conducted using mainly SPSS 17.0 (Statistical Package for the Social 
Sciences, now PASW). In order to test H1, a hierarchical block regression was performed on 
the entire sample using Safety status as criterion variable. Job satisfaction was added in the 
first block, as it is thought to be the general over all attitudes produced by the work 
environment, and is affected by the other work environment variables in the analysis. Stress 
and working conditions were added in the second block, followed by goals, relationship with 
co-workers and relationship with superiors. Demographical variables age, nationality, 
relationship status and general education were added in the fourth block. 
To test H2, the same setup as above was used with a selection variable of being a superior or a 
subordinate. In addition, t-tests were conducted in order to examine if there were significant 
differences between superior/officers and subordinates/ratings in the regression analysis. The 
formula used can be found in Howell (2002), and is shown below: 
  
     
    
     
 
 
When checking for  multi-collinearity, none of the correlations between predictor variables 
were above .6 as recommended by Skog (2005). According to Field (2009) a VIF larger than 
10 and a tolerance lower than .3 is an indicator of multi-collinearity, and Brace, Kemp, and 
Snelgar (2003) use a tolerance above .1 as a criteria for being acceptable. Table 4 shows the 
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VIF‟s and tolerances for the three models, and all models were found to be acceptable. The 
model for subordinates/ratings however, has four variables with a tolerance lower than .3 and 
two variables lower than .2, of 26 variables in total, indicating a degree of multi-collinearity 
within acceptable levels. 
Table 4: VIF and tolerance values for the three regression models 
  VIF Tolerance 
  Max Average Min Average 
Sample 2.537 1.780 .394 .593 
Superiors/Officers 3.686 2.236 .271 .481 
Subordinates/Ratings 5.751 3.061 .174 .366 
 
In order to explore the difference in predictors of the three safety dimensions (Compliance, 
Attitudes, Commitment) for superiors/officers and subordinates/ratings, a stepwise regression 
analysis were conducted. The graphical presentation is calculated using the following 
formula: 
2
1
*100% * *100
n
i
R r

  
Results 
The following two tables (table 5 and 6) show basic descriptive statistics for the sample and 
the two groups separately. Table 5 shows the mean score and standard deviation for the 
sample, superiors/officers, and subordinates/ratings, and table 6 shows the percentage 
distribution of low, neutral, and high scores on the same factors and dimensions. The tables 
shows the majority of respondents rating high on perceived safety, job satisfaction, 
satisfaction with working conditions, feeling cared for by the shipping company, and 
satisfaction with the relationship with co-workers and superiors, along with a low score on 
feeling of stress. There are also some differences between the two groups worth highlighting. 
More superiors and officers rate higher on the perceived commitment to safety, feeling of 
physical- and job safety, feeling of work strain, amount of high risk tasks, and emotional 
involvement in co-workers compared to subordinates and ratings, who in turn rate higher on 
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attitudes towards safety and satisfaction with rewards and benefits. 
 
Table 5: Mean and standard deviations for safety and work environment factors for the entire sample, 
superiors/officers and subordinates/ratings. 
  
Sample Superiors/officers Subordinates/ratings 
  
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Safety status 3.83 0.44 3.81 0.44 3.89 0.42 
 
Compliance 3.94 0.47 3.90 0.46 4.03 0.45 
 
Attitudes 3.60 0.81 3.51 0.82 3.73 0.82 
 
Commitment 3.85 0.57 3.92 0.49 3.78 0.61 
Job satisfaction 3.65 0.37 3.63 0.35 3.68 0.38 
 
Rewards and benefits 3.50 0.66 3.41 0.67 3.64 0.64 
 
Co-workers 4.00 0.47 4.02 0.40 4.01 0.41 
 
Task 3.94 0.52 3.93 0.46 3.93 0.59 
 
Meaningfullness 3.45 0.64 3.41 0.64 3.46 0.67 
 
Worry 3.71 0.52 3.66 0.55 3.77 0.45 
 
Feeling of safety 2.97 0.76 3.08 0.70 2.80 0.81 
Stress 3.50 0.54 3.46 0.55 3.58 0.53 
 
Responsebility and desicions 3.46 0.71 3.43 0.70 3.53 0.68 
 
Work strain 3.26 0.67 3.14 0.73 3.39 0.62 
 
Physical nuisance 3.50 0.85 3.57 0.83 3.52 0.85 
 
High risk tasks 3.81 1.19 3.53 1.25 4.17 1.01 
 
Isolation 3.90 1.03 4.05 1.05 3.75 0.98 
 
Variation 3.33 0.78 3.40 0.75 3.30 0.83 
Working conditions 3.42 0.46 3.37 0.45 3.48 0.47 
 
Monetary loyalty 3.21 0.91 3.11 0.98 3.32 0.80 
 
Goodwill 3.85 0.63 3.77 0.67 3.92 0.59 
 
Intent to leave 3.19 0.78 3.24 0.81 3.18 0.76 
Goals - Feeling cared for 3.47 0.67 3.53 0.68 3.43 0.62 
Relationship with co-workers 3.87 0.40 3.94 0.37 3.79 0.40 
 
Openness 4.02 0.45 4.06 0.41 3.99 0.42 
 
Social grouping 4.08 0.64 4.16 0.62 4.02 0.67 
 
Openness cross-gendered workplace 3.76 0.70 3.77 0.75 3.70 0.67 
 
Emotional involvement 3.46 0.72 3.61 0.68 3.24 0.69 
Relationship with superiors 3.80 0.45 3.79 0.42 3.88 0.46 
 
Commitment 3.74 0.54 3.70 0.52 3.83 0.52 
 
Trust 3.89 0.49 3.90 0.41 3.93 0.54 
  
N = 198-215 n = 91-97 n = 79-87 
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Table 6: Percent of low, neutral and high scores on safety- and work environment factors for superiors/officers and 
subordinates/ratings. 
  
Superiors and officers Subordinates and ratings 
  
Low Neutral High Missing Low Neutral High Missing 
Overall perceived safety - 16.5 77.3 6.2 - 10.3 81.6 8.0 
 
Perceived safety compliance - 14.4 82.5 3.1 - 8.0 88.5 3.4 
 
Attitudes towards safety 10.3 38.1 51.5 - 6.9 27.6 64.4 1.1 
 
Perceived commitment to safety - 16.5 79.4 4.1 - 31.0 64.4 4.6 
Overall job satisfaction 1.0 29.9 66.0 3.1 1.1 21.8 73.6 3.4 
 
Satisfaction with rewards and benefits 9.3 38.1 49.5 3.1 6.9 24.1 67.8 1.1 
 
Satisfaction with co-workers 1.0 2.1 96.9 - 1.1 3.4 93.1 2.3 
 
Satisfaction with tasks 1.0 10.3 88.7 - 3.4 5.7 90.8 - 
 
Perceived meaningfullness of tasks 9.3 42.3 48.5 - 9.2 36.8 54.0 - 
 
Worry about work off shift 68.0 23.7 6.2 2.1 77.0 21.8 - 1.1 
 
Feeling of physical- and job safety 32.0 32.0 36.1 - 48.3 27.6 24.1 - 
Overall  feeling of stress 48.5 42.3 3.1 6.2 44.8 43.7 2.3 9.2 
 
Stressfull responsebilities and desicions 48.5 39.2 9.3 3.1 54.0 36.8 8.0 1.1 
 
Feeling of work strain 34.0 43.3 22.7 - 40.2 52.9 5.7 1.1 
 
Amount of physical nuisance 56.7 29.9 13.4 - 46.0 42.5 11.5 - 
 
Amount of high risk tasks 55.7 14.4 26.8 3.1 78.2 6.9 11.5 3.4 
 
Feeling of isolation 76.3 9.3 14.4 - 63.2 20.7 16.1 - 
 
Variation in tasks 9.3 47.4 42.3 1.0 10.3 46.0 37.9 5.7 
Overall satisfaction with working conditions 3.1 50.5 44.3 2.1 1.1 41.4 51.7 5.7 
 
Money is reason for having this job 40.2 12.4 45.4 2.1 27.6 13.8 56.3 2.3 
 
Goodwill towards company 5.2 12.4 81.4 1.0 3.4 11.5 85.1 - 
 
Intent to leave 46.4 25.8 25.8 2.1 36.8 36.8 23.0 3.4 
Goals - Feeling cared for by company 10.3 28.9 57.7 3.1 5.7 40.2 50.6 3.4 
Satisfaction with relationship with co-workers - 8.2 88.7 3.1 - 14.9 83.9 1.1 
 
Openness towards co-workers - 4.1 93.8 2.1 - 5.7 94.3 - 
 
Social grouping amongst co-workers 3.1 4.1 92.8 - 4.6 10.3 83.9 1.1 
 
Openness towards cross-genderd workplace 8.2 13.4 77.3 1.0 8.0 18.4 73.6 - 
 
Emotional involvement in co-workers 11.3 16.5 72.2 - 19.5 34.5 46.0 - 
Satisfaction with relationship with superiors - 20.6 78.4 1.0 - 16.1 78.2 5.7 
 
Perceived commitment from superiors 1.0 29.9 68.0 1.0 1.1 21.8 74.7 2.3 
 
Trust in superiors 1.0 7.2 90.7 1.0 1.1 11.5 83.9 3.4 
  
n = 97 n = 87 
 
In order to explore the predictors of Safety status, three hierarchical linear block regression 
analyses were performed. Table 7 shows the results from the analysis based on the entire 
sample, whilst table 8 shows the results of separate analyses for superiors/officers and 
subordinates/ratings. The regression analysis for the entire sample (table 7) show Job 
satisfaction explaining 32% (Fchange (6, 155) = 12.14, p < .001) of the variance and adding Stress 
and Working conditions explaining 45% (Fchange (9, 146) = 3.83, p < .01) of the variance. When 
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including Goals, Relationship with co-workers and Relationship with superiors 58% (Fchange (7, 
137) = 6.20, p < .001) of the variance is explained, and when adding demographic variables 
(age, nationality, relationship status and general education) 62% (Fchange (4, 133) = 3.70, p < .01) 
of the variance in the model is explained. All blocks significantly contributed to added 
explained variance. The variables Co-workers (β = .24, p < .01), Feeling of safety (β = -.17, p 
< .01), Goodwill (β = .23, p < .01), Openness (β = .29, p < .001), Commitment (β = .23, p < 
.01), and General education (β = .14, p < .05) were found to have significant predictive power 
when all blocks were added. Thus supporting the first hypothesis (H1).  
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Table 7: Hierarchical block regression analysis with Safety status: superiors/officers and subordinates/ratings  
 
Predictors  Block 1 Block 
2 
Block 3 Block 4 
     β β β β 
Job satisfaction  Rewards & benefits  .11 -.02 -.14 -.15 
Co-workers    .45*** .38**
* 
.21* .24** 
Task  -.11 -.15 -.09 -.09 
Meaningfulness    .18** .23** .11 .10 
Worry  -.04 .01 -.01 -.04 
Feeling of safety  -.19** -.14* -.18** -.17** 
Stress  Resp. & decisions     -.01 .00 .05 
Work strain   -.03 .01 -.02 
Physical nuisance     .02 .03 .03 
High risk tasks   .02 .03 .04 
Isolation     -.02 -.01 .00 
Variation     .03 .03 .05 
Working conditions  Monetary loyalty   .06 .03 .00 
Goodwill     .39**
* 
.20** .23** 
Intent to leave     -.08 -.04 -.03 
Goals  Feeling cared for      .11 .11 
Relationship with co-workers  Openness    .31*** .29*** 
Social grouping      .01 .01 
Working with opposite gender    -.06 -.05 
Emotional involvement      -.09 -.10 
Relationship with superiors  Commitment    .25** .23** 
Trust    .06 .04 
Demographic  Age     -.02 
Nationality     .12 
Relationship status     -.06 
Education     .14* 
 
 
R²  
Adj. R
2
 
.32 
.29 
.45 
.39 
.58 
.51 
.62 
.55 
  Fchange  12.14*** 3.83*
** 
6.20*** 3.70** 
   N  172     
 
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001  
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The regression analysis for superiors/officers and subordinate/ratings is shown in table 8. For 
officers and ratings job satisfaction explains 41% (Fchange (6, 71) = 8.28, p < .001) of the 
variance in safety status, and adding Stress and Working conditions explains 60% (Fchange (9, 62) 
= 3.21, p < .01) of the variance. When including Goals, Relationship with co-workers and 
Relationship with superiors 74% (Fchange (7, 53) = 4.04, p < .01) of the variance is explained, and 
when adding demographic variables (age, nationality, relationship status and general 
education) 78% (Fchange (4, 49) = 2.39, p > .05) of the variance in the model is explained. All 
blocks, except the demographic block, contributed significantly to added explained variance. 
Co-workers (β = .28, p < .05), Feeling of safety (β = -.24, p < .01), Working with opposite 
gender (β = -.24, p < .01), Trust in superiors (β = .31, p < .01) , Nationality (β = .17, p < .05), 
and Education (β = .21, p < .05) where found to have significant predictive power on Safety 
status. 
For subordinates/ratings the table show Job satisfaction explaining 29% (Fchange (6, 56) = 3.82, p 
< .01) of the variance. When adding Stress and Working conditions the model explains 54% 
(Fchange (9, 47) = 2.93, p > .01) of the variance, and including Goals, Relationship with co-
workers and Relationship with superiors leads to 70% (Fchange (7, 38) = 3.16, p < .01) of the 
variance explained. When finally adding demographic variables (age, nationality, relationship 
status and general education) the entire model explain 73% (Fchange (4, 34) = 0.97, p > .05) of the 
variance. Similar to the analysis for superiors and officers only block 1 (Job satisfaction) and 
block 2 (Goals, Relationship with co-workers, and Relationship with superiors) where found 
to significantly contribute to explained variance. Variables found to be significant association 
with the criterion variable were Worry (β = -.43, p < .05), Feeling of safety (β = -.30, p < .05), 
Monetary loyalty (β = .-41, p < .01), Goodwill (β = .30, p < .05), and Openness towards co-
workers (β = .39, p < .01). 
Many differences between the two groups emerged from the analysis, as shown in table 8, and 
Feeling of safety where the only factor significant and with high predictive power for both 
groups. Satisfaction with co-workers, Working with the opposite gender, Trust in superiors, 
Nationality, and Education where only significant for superiors and officers and all factors 
except for Satisfaction with co-workers had more predictive power then for subordinates and 
ratings. Worry, Monetary loyalty, Goodwill, and Openness towards co-workers where 
significant and with more predictive power for subordinates/ratings. However, when testing 
these differences with t-tests (table 9), significant differences were only found in four of the 
nine factors. Work strain also emerged as a significant difference between the two groups, but 
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was not significant for any of the two groups in the regression analysis, despite having a high 
predictive power for subordinates and ratings. Working with the opposite gender (t(158) = -
2.48, p < .05), and Trust in superiors (t(158) = 2.57, p < .05) had significantly more predictive 
power for superiors and officers, whilst Worry (t(158) = 2.36, p < .05), Work strain (t(158) = -
2.09, p < .05), and Monetary loyalty (t(158) = 3.10, p < .001) had significantly more predictive 
power for subordinates and ratings when all blocks were added. With the prediction of finding 
differences between the two groups (H2), this hypothesis was supported. 
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Table 8: Hierarchical block regression analysis with Safety status, showing β for superiors/officers and subordinates/ratings 
 
  Predictors  Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 
    
sup/off 
 β 
sub/rat 
 β 
sup/off 
 β 
sub/rat 
 β 
sup/off 
 β 
sub/rat 
 β 
sup/off 
 β 
sub/rat 
 β 
Job 
satisfaction 
Rewards & benefits  -.06 .22 -.14 -.04 -.18 -.07 -.20 -.05 
Co-workers   .40*** .66*** .29** .61*** .20* .27 .25* .32 
Task  -.02 -.23 -.03 -.27 -.05 -.08 -.05 -.03 
Meaningfulness   .38*** .00 .41*** -.02 .25* -.06 .20 -.06 
Worry  -.06 -.25 .04 -.29 .04 -.35* .03 -.43* 
Feeling of safety  -.26** -.18 -.19* -.31* -.24** -.28* -.24** -30* 
Stress Resp. & decisions     -.01 -.05 .00 -.11 .02 -.05 
Work strain    -.15 .27 -.07 .36* -.09 .30 
Physical nuisance     -.07 .09 -.06 .05 -.05 .07 
High risk tasks    -.01 -.05 .08 -.10 .10 -.15 
Isolation     .11 -.15 .10 -.11 .07 -.03 
Variation     .07 .15 .04 .10 .07 .11 
Working 
conditions 
Monetary loyalty    .16 -.30* .16 -.31* .13 -.41** 
Goodwill     .39*** .49*** .09 .33** .14 .30* 
Intent to leave     -.19 .05 -.09 .02 -.03 .05 
Goals Feeling cared for       .11 .16 .15 .09 
Relationship 
with co-
workers 
Openness      .19 .41** .16 .39** 
Social grouping       .08 -.02 .05 -.03 
Working with opposite gender      -.22* .10 -.24** .11 
Emotional involvement       .03 -.04 .03 -.06 
Relationship 
with superiors 
Commitment      .07 .23 .03 .20 
Trust      .29** -.14 .31** -.10 
Demographic Age       -.01 -.05 
Nationality       .17* .04 
Relationship status       .04 .01 
Education       .21* .20 
 
 
R²  .41 .29 .60 .54 .74 .70 .78 .73 
Adj. R
2
 .36 .21 .50 .40 .63 .54 .66 .54 
   Fchange  8.28*** 3.82** 3.21** 2.93** 4.04*** 3.16** 2.39 0.97 
   Nsup/off  =  78  Nsub/rat  =  63      
  
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001  
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Table 9: T-tests of regression coefficients between superiors/officers and subordinates/ratings  
   Safety 
status     t(158)   
Rewards & benefits   -0.77 
Co-workers     -0.29 
Task   -0.07 
Meaningfulness     1.61 
Worry   2.36*   
Feeling of safety   0.43 
Resp. & decisions     0.41 
Work strain   -2.09*   
Physical nuisance     -0.88 
High risk tasks   1.56 
Isolation     0.65 
Variation     -0.25 
Monetary loyalty   3.10***  
Goodwill    -0.99 
Intent to leave    -0.51 
Feeling cared for    0.33 
Openness   -1.36 
Social grouping    0.43 
Working with opposite gender   -2.48*  
Emotional involvement    0.55 
Commitment   -0.76 
Trust   2.57*  
Age  0.51 
Nationality  0.75 
Relationship status  0.11 
Education  0.07 
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001  
 
In order to explore the difference in predictors of the three safety dimensions (Compliance, 
Attitudes, Commitment) for superiors/officers and subordinates/ratings, a stepwise regression 
analysis were conducted. Figure 1 shows the results from the analysis. The blocks are stacked 
by factors, shown by the gray blocks, in order from the bottom; Job satisfaction, Stress, 
Working conditions, Goals, Relationship with co-workers, and Relationship with superiors. 
Demography variables are not marked by gray blocks and reside at the top.  
Figure 1 show 68.4% of Operational atmosphere for superiors/officers being explained by the 
work environment and demographical variables, whilst for subordinates/ratings explained 
variance is 50.5%. Attitudes is explained with 42.4% for superiors/officers and 58.2% for 
subordinated/ratings, and in Commitment the work environment for superiors/officers and 
subordinates/ratings explain 33.0% and 32.7% respectively. 
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In Operational atmosphere for superiors/officers Co-workers (10.0%, t(78) = 2.57, p < .05), 
Feeling of safety (8.2%, t(78) = -3.83, p < .001), Responsibility and decisions (3.5%, t(78) = 
2.06, p < .05), Openness (18.6%, t(78) = 4.17, p < .001), Working with opposite gender (4.8%, 
t(78) = -2.88, p < .05), Trust in superiors (10.1%, t(78) = 2.71, p < .01), Nationality (2.7%, t(78) = 
2.19, p < .05), and Education (4.1%, t(78) = 2.56, p < .05) contribute significantly. For 
subordinates/ratings, Work strain (4.7%, t(64) = 2.29, p < .05), Openness (26.6%, t(64) = 4.35, p 
< .001), and Commitment (19.2%, t(64) = 3.26, p < .001) contribute significantly to explained 
variance. This results in a total significant explained variance of 62.0% for superiors/officers 
and 50.5% for subordinates/ratings. 
Rules and regulations for superiors/officers had a total explained variance of 42.4%, and a 
significantly explained variance of 37.1% comprised of Meaningfulness (14.8%, t(78) = -3.27, 
p < .01), Feeling of safety (6.8%, t(78) = -2.43, p < .05), Goodwill (10.0%, t(78) = 3.16, p < .01), 
Nationality (2.5%, t(78) = 2.42, p < .05), and Education (6.3%, t(78) = 2.44, p < .05). For 
subordinates/ratings the total variance explained was 58.2% with all variables, Worry (1.1%, 
t(64) = -3.37, p < .01), Feeling of safety (9.4%, t(64) = -4.10, p < .001), Variation (2.0%, t(64) = 
2.60, p < .01), Monetary loyalty (7.6%, t(64) = -3.90, p < .01), Goodwill (11.0%, t(64) = 3.16, p 
< .01), Feeling cared for (16.2%, t(64) = 3.69, p < .01), Openness (5.6%, t(64) = 2.06, p < .01), 
and Education (7.5%, t(64) = 2.50, p < .01), contributing significantly to explained variance. 
In Commitment all variables contribute significantly to explained variance for both groups. 
For superiors and officers, Work strain (9.4%, t(78) = -2.81, p < .01), Working with opposite 
gender (3.8%, t(78) = -2.07, p < .05), Trust (19.8%, t(78) = 4.36, p < .001) giving a total 
significant explained variance of 33.0%. Whilst for subordinates and ratings, Worry (4.3%, 
t(64) = -3.47, p < .001), Openness (13.1%, t(64) = 2.69, p < .01), Working with opposite gender 
(6.2%, t(64) = 2.48, p < .05), and Commitment (9.1%, t(64) = 2.44, p < .05) contribute 
significantly to explained variance, giving a total significant explained variance of 32.7%.  
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Discussion 
The perceived work environment 
Overall, the seafarers in this study seem to be content with the perceived work environment 
on board the ships in this study. The majority of scores rated the work environment variables 
from neutral to high; although there are variations and some seafarers also rated some 
variables at the lowest possible score. Superiors and officers reported to have a high trust in 
their superiors, and subordinates and ratings were very satisfied with their tasks. Both 
superiors/officers and subordinates/ratings were especially satisfied with their co-workers and 
and the openness between them. Both shipping companies in this study state that the social 
well-being of their employees is important to them, and create opportunities were the 
seafarers get time to socialize and get to know each other. The high scores on satisfaction with 
co-workers could be a result from these prioritizations. 
On the other side, about 1/3 of superiors/officers and half of the subordinates/ratings reported 
to have low feeling of physical safety and job safety. About a quarter of superiors and officers 
felt a high work strain and high amount of high risk tasks, and about half of both groups also 
reported to have a high intent to leave. This intent to leave may be partially explained by the 
scores on monetary loyalty, where almost half of superiors and officers and just over half of 
subordinates and ratings report high on the salary being the main reason to keep their job. If a 
better offer would arrive from another shipping company this reason would vanish. 
Work environment as a predictor of safety status regression 
Explaining 62% of the variance in safety status for the entire sample, and 78% and 73% of the 
variance explained for superiors/officers and subordinates/ratings respectively, this model 
explain much of the variance in Safety status. Differences between the significance and size 
of predictors for superiors/officers and subordinates/ratings did emerge, and even more 
differences appeared when investigating the three safety factors Compliance, Attitudes, and 
Commitment in the Safety status dimension. As expected, the work environment was found to 
be a significant predictor of Safety status, for both superiors/officers, subordinates/ratings, 
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and for the entire sample. However, there is need for further exploration and studies in order 
to create a model explaining the associations between the work environment and safety status.  
Work environment variables predicting Safety status 
For the entire sample, high satisfaction with co-workers and openness with co-workers were 
significant predictors of better safety status. This is in accordance with earlier findings 
(Antonsen, 2009; Shannon, et al., 1997). If you develop a caring relationship with your co-
workers one could assume that you would want to keep them safe. This could also relate to 
SCB, where better satisfaction with the workplace would lead to a more caring towards the 
company and its interests (Håvold & Nesset, 2009; K. Mearns & Reader, 2008). High 
goodwill towards the company and superiors and officers‟ commitment towards the company 
and safety where also significant predictors of better safety status, which is also in accordance 
with earlier findings (Hofmann & Morgeson, 1999; Høivik, et al., 2007; Rundmo, 1994; 
Shannon, et al., 1997), and SCB along with POS (Mearns & Reader, 2008; Rhoades & 
Eisenberger, 2002). Feeling of safety was also a significant predictor of safety status, as found 
in earlier research (perceived risk; Rundmo, 1995) and (job insecurity; Ashford, et al., 1989; 
Probst & Brubaker, 2001). Perceived risk could be explained by the general desire of self-
preservation in human beings, where risk is perceived steps are taken to reduce those risks 
and increase the chances of nothing dangerous happening. Whereas job insecurity can be 
related to SCB, with job insecurity leading to lower organizational commitment and 
satisfaction, resulting in less desire to please the company and to protect its interests. 
Regarding the demographical variables General education was a significant predictor of safety 
status, but in earlier research, this association was not significant. This is opposite to age, 
which has been found to be a significant predictor of safety in earlier research, but was not 
significant in this analysis (Shannon, et al., 1997). 
Interestingly, stress factors were not found to be significant predictors of safety status. 
According to earlier findings one would expect such factors as the burden of responsibility 
and decisions and work strain to be a predictor for safety status. When comparing the two 
groups superiors/officers and subordinates/ratings, work strain becomes a significant 
difference and explain significantly more variation for subordinates and ratings. A possible 
explanation as to why age and stress where not found to be significant in this analysis could 
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be the sample size. As the sample size of this study is fairly small, one could expect some 
changes in the analysis if using a larger sample. 
Group differences between superiors/officers and subordinates/ratings 
Many of the significant predictors of safety status changed when the hierarchical block 
regression where conducted separately on superiors/officers and subordinates/ratings. The 
amount of explained variance also increased for both groups compared. The block with 
demographical variables were however not significant. This support the assumption that sub-
cultures has emerged on board the ships, where the work environment is differently associated 
with safety status between the two groups.  
For both groups Feeling of safety were a significant predictor. This could be explained with 
the need for safety and with survival being a basic human desire regardless of culture. 
Satisfaction with co-workers could also be argued to be a general determinant of satisfaction 
with the job, and applying earlier SCB research – should be a predictor for safety status. This 
variable however, was only significant for superiors and officers, despite being a larger 
predictor for subordinates and ratings. This could be explained by the small sample size but 
could also be a less important variable for subordinates and ratings. 
In addition; attitudes towards working with the opposite gender, trust in superiors, nationality, 
and education significantly predicted safety status for superiors and officers, whilst worry, 
monetary loyalty, goodwill towards the company, and openness amongst co-workers were 
significant predictors for subordinates and ratings. As the grouping variable for the two 
groups is command, one could expect the differences in predictors to be explained by the 
different characteristics of being a superior/officer or subordinate/rating.  
For superiors and officers, trust in superiors could be explained by the fact that they 
themselves also are superiors, and are expected to pass on orders to their own workers. This 
could result in a more conscious evaluation of the sensibility of the order, and competence of 
the superior issuing the order, compared to subordinates and ratings which are expected to 
follow orders regardless. Another explanation could be the distance and possibility of 
surveillance between the superiors giving the order and the person expected to follow said 
order. On board the ship, ratings have their immediate superior close by, but superiors often 
have their superiors based on shore. This could lead to trust being a larger predictor as it could 
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be comparatively easier to disregard an order. Nationality and education for superiors and 
officers could have a larger predictor as superiors and officers generally have higher 
education than subordinates and ratings, and also tend to be from a specific nationality. In this 
sample, the majority of superiors and officers are Indian, whilst the majority of subordinates 
and ratings are Filipino. Attitudes towards working with the opposite gender significantly 
contributed to explained variance in safety status for superiors and officers. This is an 
unexpected result, as there seem to be no apparent association between the two. Although, one 
possible explanation for this could be that as attitudes from leaders tend to rub off on those 
they supervise, superiors and officers are expected to stand as a good example for other 
employees. The strive to live up to the expectations of a good role model could be reflected in 
their attitudes towards working with the opposite gender, by trying to maintain a good social 
climate, not being prejudges and keeping an open mind for changes. 
For subordinates and ratings, worrying about the job of shift, monetary reasons for having the 
job, goodwill towards the company, and openness amongst co-workers are significant 
predictors of safety status. These variables could just as well be important for both groups as 
supported by earlier findings. One explanation for this could be that superiors and officers in 
fact do have these variables as predictors for safety status, but the additional „burden of 
command‟ make other variables more prominent, and therefore downplays the role of these 
variables. This theory is partially supported by the significance test on the regression 
coefficients between the two groups. Where only worry, work strain, monetary loyalty, 
attitudes towards working with the opposite gender, and trust where found to be significantly 
different between the two groups. This however leaves the differences in worry and monetary 
loyalty left to be explained. One possible explanation for monetary loyalty is the time and 
effort put into achieving the present position within the shipping company. As superiors and 
officers have worked to get a position of command, they would most likely strive to keep this 
position or advance further up in rank. Subordinates and ratings on the other hand would 
probably have an easier time getting the same position as they have, should they choose to 
leave for another shipping company or experience not having their contract renewed. As 
monetary loyalty is a negative predictor of safety status, this could explain the effort 
subordinates and ratings feel they have to put into safety in order to perform „adequately‟. 
Worrying about work, off duty, however seem to have no apparent reason for being 
significantly different. If this could be explained by worrying being a distraction regarding 
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safety there seem to be no reason for this variable to be different for the two groups, and 
warrants further studying. 
Predicting compliance, attitudes and commitment 
The graph showing the work environment and demographical predictors for the three safety 
factors separately (figure 1) show compliance with rules and regulations to be dominated by 
job satisfaction and satisfaction with relationship with co-workers and superiors. This could 
be explained by SCB and POS theory, along with the culture generated from the social 
interactions reported in relationship with co-workers and superiors. Job satisfaction could lead 
to more positive attitudes towards the job, hence the company, resulting in a desire to „give 
something back to the company in form of more safety for personnel and materials. The 
culture could dictate the norm which employees is expected to follow in order to not risk 
standing out or social exclusion. 
Attitudes towards rules and regulations are mostly explained by job satisfaction, working 
conditions and company goals. This again fits well with the theory on SCB and POS where a 
mutual beneficial relationship is formed between the company and its employees. The 
shipping company prioritizes the well-being of the seafarers and the seafarers repay this by 
keeping acting safe and generally trying to help the company any way they can. 
Commitment towards safety is the factor which is less explained by the work environment, 
with satisfaction with the relationship with superiors and officers explaining most of the 
variance. This could be the results of the same cultural standard of what is expected of the 
seafarers on board a particular ship. Commitment towards safety however, could be defined as 
a personal preference towards how to approach safety issues, and not defined as part of the 
job description. Commitment towards safety could therefore be explained by other factors 
than work environment and demographical properties. 
Methodical challenges 
With the respondents in this study consisting mainly of Filipino and Norwegian sailors from 
almost exclusively Roll-on-Roll-off- and Pure-Car-and-Truck Carriers, the results are not 
representative for the population of sailors. National differences in working conditions like 
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salary, contract length, and standards can result in differences in expectations and satisfaction 
with present circumstance. The different types of cargo carried by ships (e.g. containers, cars, 
chemicals) also pose different kinds of dangers, and consequently require different levels of 
safety measures. Generalizing the results across different ship types and other nationalities 
will therefore be difficult.  
The differences between superiors/officers and subordinates/ratings may also have been 
affected by nationality culture. Some ships and shipping companies tend to have ratings 
recruited from countries with low-salary workforce like the Philippines, and officers from 
western countries (Norway and India in this sample). This could emphasize differences 
between the two groups, and national culture has also been found to have an effect on 
response styles (Silverthorne, 2005). 
The size of the sample in this study was not optimal. The work environment factors were 
however able to explain much of the variations in the regression analyses and all sampling 
adequacy-tests were satisfactory in both the factor- and regression analyses. 
Conclusion 
Although there are some limitations, the results found in this study are believed to be useful 
when considering non-direct ways to improve upon the safety climate. The work environment 
was found to be strongly associated with safety status for seafarers in both superiors/officers 
and subordinates/ratings. Although, this is statistical prediction and does not imply causality, 
SCB and POS theory along with earlier findings give reason to suspect a causal association. 
This could make the work environment a key focus area when trying to further improve upon 
the safety attitudes, the level of safety commitment, and compliance with rules and 
procedures. Having superiors and officers that care and support their employees, emphasizing 
the company‟s commitment and prioritization of their employees, and ensuring an open and 
caring environment amongst co-workers could be an indirect way of improving on safety for 
all seafarers. The results also indicate the need for separate initiatives, with a focus on 
building trust between the management and the superiors/officers, and ensuring that the 
subordinates/ratings feel that management and their leaders care about them and give them 
satisfactory salaries. For shipping companies struggling to keep seafarers motivated to 
maintaining a safe work environment, these findings could prove useful.   
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Abstract 
The aim of the study was to examine the association between undesired events and accidents, 
and safety status. A total of 24 ships participated in this quantitative survey study with a total 
of 170 seafarers (71 superiors/officers, 71 subordinates/ratings), leaving a response rate of 
35.5%. Testing the differences in the safety status on ships with high and low number of 
undesired events and accidents separately on the two groups, significant differences emerged 
only for superiors and officers; Significant differences were found in compliance when 
comparing high and low number of undesired events, and safety status and compliance when 
comparing high and low number of accidents. Significant differences were also found 
between superiors/officers and subordinates/ratings, in compliance and attitudes. Results 
indicate subordinates and ratings having a more accurate depiction of the safety status on 
board ships, however further studies is required before an conclusions can be made regarding 
both differences between superiors/officers and subordinates/ratings, and the associations 
between undesired events and accidents, and safety status. The study was conducted in 
collaboration with Det Norske Veritas (DNV). 
 
KEYWORDS; Shipping, Safety, Attitudes, Commitment, Compliance, Undesired events, 
Accidents. 
  
90 
 
Introduction 
Safety culture has been a highly researched topic for the last two decades, and most 
companies with high-risk labor is constantly monitoring, measuring and trying to improve 
upon the safety culture or safety climate. The belief that safety culture can be used as an 
alternate safety performance can be an appealing thought, and many researchers are trying to 
establish a connection between safety culture or safety climate and occupational injuries and 
accidents. The resulting associations found in studies vary. One of the possible explanations 
for such differences in results could be the state of safety culture and safety climate as a 
concept. Since the first emergence of safety culture (OECD Nuclear Agency Report in 1987) 
and safety climate (Research project on a locomotive plant in 1951 by Keenan, Kerr and 
Sherman, in Guldenmund, 2000) the theory has evolved, but the model is by some researchers 
still considered to be in its infancy (Guldenmund 2000). The definitions and 
operationalization of the concept has not yet reached an agreed upon standard, and hence 
neither a commonly accepted causal model of its dimensions (Fernandez-Muniz, Montes-
Peon, & Vazquez-Ordas, 2007; Guldenmund, 2000). The relationship between safety culture 
and safety climate do also have different views. If it is part of the same construct, measures 
different part of a broader construct, one preceding the other or one measuring parts of the 
other (Guldenmund, 2000). There are however some consensus on which elements should be 
included in safety culture and safety climate when they are to be operationalized. 
Safety climate is by many considered to be the „visual‟ part of safety culture, and has 
constantly featured employees‟ attitudes or perceptions of safety – defined by Zohar (2000) 
as: “Essentially climate perceptions relate to „procedures as patterns‟ whereby consistent 
procedures represent patterns that reflect the importance and prioritization of safety over 
competing goals”. If safety climate consists of employee‟s attitudes and beliefs, it could also 
affect employee behavior. One can then argue that a positive safety climate will induce safe 
behavior from the employee‟s where employees are less likely to exhibit unsafe behavior, not 
take unnecessary risks, and comply with rules and regulations (Clarke, 2006b; Lund & Aarø, 
2004; Seo, 2005), which according to Reason (1990) is the forerunner or accident 
involvement.  
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Relationship between the safety climate and occupational injuries and accidents 
The overall safety climate has been found to be related to employee behavior and 
occupational injuries.  Neal Griffin and Hart (2000) found safety climate to predict safety 
performance, and to be mediated by safety knowledge and safety motivation, and a study by 
Garcia, Boix and Canosa (2004) on industrial workers found lower levels of safety climate to 
be related to workers‟ unsafe behavior. This relationship has been supported in later studies 
were the perceived safety climate was found to predict employees‟ safety behavior (Clarke, 
2006b; Garcia, et al., 2004; Seo, 2005).  
As research on safety climate progresses, there are different parts of safety climate and safety 
culture that has been found to be associated with injuries and accidents in the work place. As 
attitudes, compliance and commitment can be considered a visible part of safety culture, these 
constructs are used as safety status in the present study. Safety status is defined as the self-
reported perceived status of safety, consisting of the employees‟ perceptions of the attitudes to 
rules and regulations, along with perceived compliance with said rules and regulations and 
commitment towards overall safety. 
Attitudes and compliance 
Lawton and Parker (1998) reviewed studies of attitudinal and motivational predictors in 
relation to the commission of violation at work and found that employee attitudes to risk and 
safety correlated with accidents. A study on Chinese construction workers by Siu, Phillips and 
Leung (2004), showed that attitudes to safety predicted occupational injuries, but not accident 
rates. Vinodkumar and Bhasi (2009), in a study on chemical workers in India, found attitudes 
towards safety to be significantly higher in companies with a low accident rate. As mentioned, 
Reason (1990) describe unsafe behavior as the forerunner of accident involvement, and 
studies investigating behavior and accident rates have found evidence to support this 
connection.  
Unsafe behavior has been found to be the best predictor for accident involvement (Hofmann 
& Stetzer, 1996; Lawton, 1998), accidents and near-misses (Mearns, Flin, Gordon, & 
Fleming, 2001), and predict injury and accident rates (Glasscock, Rasmussen, Carstensen, & 
Hansen, 2006). Likewise in the mentioned study by Vinodkumar and Bhasi (2009) also 
showed compliance with rules and regulations along with management commitment to safety 
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to be significantly higher in companies with a low accident rate. According to this, a ship 
consisting of sailors with a positive attitude to safety could be expected to behave in a safer 
manner and avoid unnecessary risks. It is therefore hypothesized that: 
H1: Ships with low number of undesired events and accidents will score higher on attitudes 
towards rules and regulations. 
H2: Ships with low number of undesired events and accidents is expected to score higher on 
compliance with rules and regulations 
Commitment 
Creating rules and regulation in order to facilitate a safer work environment and expecting 
employees to follow them is one of many ways companies try to improve on safety. Another 
way would be to motivate the employees to actively make evaluations and decisions on safety 
as they perform their tasks. An employees that is committed towards safety, takes initiatives, 
notifies superiors on deficiencies or fault in safety and consciously make decisions on how to 
perform their work in a safe manner, in addition to caring about what is best for the company 
could be argued to be contributing to making the workplace safer. Such committed employees 
would, to a company and their co-workers, be valuable resources. Research within 
organizational- and safety commitment has shown them to be associated with occupational 
injuries and accidents. For example, a longitudinal study on offshore platforms in the North 
Sea by Mearns, Whitaker and Flin (2003), found management commitment towards safety to 
be significantly associated with official accident statistics. But in order to investigate 
commitment, new constructs such as Safety Citizenship Behavior (SCB) and Perceived 
Organizational Support (POS) has been created. 
SCB is a relatively new concept and is demonstrated by employees taking actions like helping 
co-workers, promoting safety programs, demonstrating initiative, and suggesting changes for 
improving safety. Safety citizenship behavior has been found to correlate (r = .47 to r = .64) 
with compliance (Didla, Mearns, & Flin, 2009). Clarke (2006a) found high levels of SCB and 
compliance to lead to a reduction in accidents. Similar constructs to SCB has been found to 
have an effect on safety performance, and Didla (2009) see SCB as a potentially important 
aspect of reducing risk. Mearns and Reader (2008) investigated SCB and POS, and found 
high levels of both to be beneficiary towards safety performance. 
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POS is the employees‟ perception of the organization‟s support, commitment, and care 
towards them. POS has been found to be positively related to conscientiousness in carrying 
out conventional job responsibilities (Eisenberger, Fasolo, & Davis-LaMastro, 1990). A study 
by Mearns and Hope (2005) showed that employees with a high level of POS showed 
increased commitment, lower levels of unsafe behavior and were more compliant towards 
rules and regulations.Based on these findings, it is expected that: 
H3: Ships with low number of undesired events and accidents is expected to score higher on 
commitment. 
Differences in sub-culture 
When employees work together they can often form their own sub-culture within an 
organization, with a mutual understanding of how they do things. These sub-cultures can 
evolve in different departments, positions, and levels of management (Clarke, 1999; Harvey, 
et al., 2002). In a study by Hofstede (1998), in a large Danish insurance company, he found 
three distinct sub-cultures: a professional sub-culture, an administrative sub-culture, and a 
costumer interface sub-culture. A study by Mearns, Flin, Gordon, and Fleming (1998) on 
offshore employees found evidence suggesting attitudes towards safety, for the permanent 
staff, were influenced by whether they were superiors/officers or not. This is supported in a 
later study by Håvold (2005) who found significant differences between the knowledge of 
safety protocols, and he argues that this may be because superiors have a responsibility for the 
safety of the employees they supervise. A recent study by Bjerkan (2010), on employees in 
the Norwegian offshore and oil industry showed mixed results, and concluded that groups 
need to be taken into account when investigating the effects of safety climate and perceptions 
of the work environment  on subjective health statuses as well as accident frequencies. Since 
one can expect superiors/officers and subordinates/ratings to develop group dependent 
perceptions and beliefs of safety, along with their differences in responsibility and work, it is 
expected to find differences between the two: 
H4: There will be differences between superiors/officers and subordinates/ratings in their 
subjective perception of the safety status on board. 
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Method 
Sample 
The sample was collected from two Norwegian shipping companies, one industrial shipping 
company, and one cruise ship company – with the help of Det Norske Veritas (DNV). Only 
one of the shipping companies was included in the analyses since the data on undesired events 
and accidents were not compatible between the two companies. The data and sample from the 
industrial shipping company is therefore used as the number of respondents and ships were 
the highest. The questionnaire was designed in Microsoft Excel in order to survey data from 
multiple respondents before being sent back. The questionnaire was sent by e-mail to the 
captains of 24 ships, selected by the shipping companies‟ management to participate in the 
survey. All ships were either in lay-up or in transit. When everyone wanting to participate in 
the study had been given the opportunity to do so, the questionnaire was returned. Everyone 
on the ship was invited to participate in the survey, and given information that the study were 
voluntary, all information would be kept anonymous, confidential and no individual answers 
would be relayed to the shipping company. The participants were also informed that a 
summary report would be given to the shipping company at the conclusion of the study. 
A total of 215 seafarers completed the questionnaire resulting in a response rate of 35%, 
where 170 of these respondents and 13 ships are relevant for this study. Detailed 
demographics are shown in table 1. All respondents reported to be male (95.3%), with 8 
missing (4.7%). The majority of respondents reported to be in the age between 25 and 34 
(34.7%), followed by 45 years or older (29.4%), between 35 and 44 (20.6%), and 24 years or 
younger (15.3%). The main nationality represented in the sample are Filipino (63.3%) 
followed by Norwegian (21.4%) and Indian (11.6%). The distribution between superiors 
/officers and subordinates/ratings were equal (41.8%) with some missing (16.5%). A little 
over half of the respondents worked on carrier ships (Roll-on-Roll-off 53.5%, Pure-Car-
Truck-Carrier 32.9%, bulk 4.1%) and a few on passenger ships or cruise ships (2.4%). The 
sample shows most respondents working on deck (41.9%) and engine (33.0%), followed by 
catering (8.8%), bridge (8.4%), assistants, cadets and other (6.1%) with four missing (1.9%). 
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Table 1: Detailed demographics 
Variable No. Respondents (percent) 
Gender  
 Male 162 (95.3%) 
 Missing 8 (4.7%) 
Age  
 24 or younger 26 (15.3%) 
 25 - 34 59 (34.7%) 
 35 - 44 35 (20.6%) 
 45 or older 50 (29.4%) 
Superior or subordinate 
 
Officer / Manager 71 (41.8%) 
 
Rating / Subordinate 71 (41.8%) 
 
Missing 28 (16.5%) 
Position 
 
Deck 90 (41.9%) 
 
Engine 71 (33.0%) 
 
Ship assistant 1 (0.5%) 
 
Apprentice/Cadet 8 (37%) 
 
Bridge 18 (8.4%) 
 
Catering 19 (8.8%) 
 
Other 4 (1.9%) 
 
Missing 4 (1.9%) 
Nationality  
 
Norwegian 19 (11.2%) 
 
Filipino 127 (74.7%) 
 
Indian 16 (9.4%) 
 
Other 7 (4.2%) 
 
Missing 1 (0.6%) 
Tyoe of ship 
 
PCTC 56 (32.9%) 
 
Ro-Ro 91 (53.5%) 
 
Passenger / Cruise 4 (2.4%) 
 
Bulk carrier 7 (4.1%) 
 
Other 9 (5.3%) 
 Missing 3 (1.8%) 
Total 170 (100%) 
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Material 
Questionnaire 
The questionnaire used in this study was developed for DNV in order to examine the work 
environment on board ships, and selected items from DNV‟s Insight questionnaire were added 
to assess the safety status. For information on the development of the questionnaire, see 
article 1. The items and questionnaire can be found in appendix B. Three safety factors were 
identified; compliance with rules and regulations, attitudes towards rules and regulations, and 
commitment to overall safety. These three factors were used to create Safety status. Safety 
status is used in this study as an alternative to safety culture and safety climate, as these 
constructs vary in definition and usage. Safety status is here defined as the self-reported 
perceived status of safety, in regards to compliance with rules and regulations, attitudes 
towards said rules and regulations, and commitment to overall safety.  
Internal consistency of the scales is shown in table 2, and is based on the total sample used in 
article 1. All were found to have an acceptable alpha (α  > .70) (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994), 
except for Commitment (α  = .57). However, as Commitment has an acceptable average inter-
item correlation (r >.30), the factor is kept in the analysis (Field, 2009). Items in the safety 
factors can be found in appendix A. 
Table 2: Internal consistency and average item-total correlation 
      α  
Average inter-
item correlation  Items  
Safety status   .79  .44  12 
 
Compliance  .74  .49  6 
 
Attitudes  .76  .60  3 
 
Commitment   .57  .39  3 
N 
 
207-215 
  Likert-scale range 1-5 
   
Undesired events and accidents data 
The data collected regarding undesired events and accidents were retrieved from the annual 
reports for the two shipping companies. The data used were from the last quarter of 2009, two 
month prior to the questionnaire data collection. As the two data sets where incompatible 
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based on definitions and logging procedure, only the data from the industrial shipping 
company were kept in order to preserve validity and to keep the largest number of 
respondents and ships. 
Accident in this study is defined as: “An event which causes injury or illness to personnel 
and/or damage or loss of property, material, or damage to the environment, or to a third 
party” (Norsk Standard 5814, ISO 14001:1996). 
Whilst undesired events is defined as: “An event which could have caused injury or illness to 
personnel and/or damage or loss of property, material, damages to the environment, or to a 
third party” (Norsk Standard 5814, ISO 14001:1996). 
Statistical Analysis 
Statistical analyses were conducted using SPSS 17.0 (Statistical Package for the Social 
Sciences, now PASW) and Microsoft Excel. A Pearson‟s correlation was conducted on the 
safety factors and number of undesired events and accidents to examine the relationship 
between safety status and safety performance. In order to test H1, H2 and H3 ships were 
separated into two groups based on high or low number of undesired events and accidents. T-
tests were conducted to examine any differences in compliance, attitudes and commitment 
between the groups. T-tests were also conducted to examine any differences in the perceived 
safety status between superiors/officers and subordinates/ratings. 
Results 
Table 3 show superiors/officers and subordinates/ratings percentage of low, neutral and high 
scores on overall safety status and on the individual safety factors compliance, attitudes and 
commitment, divided on ships with high and low number of undesired events and high and 
low number of accidents. As the table shows, on ships with high number of undesired events 
and accidents, the majority of superiors/officers and subordinates/ratings rate all safety factors 
as high. Similar agreement is seen on ships with low number of undesired events and 
accidents, where the majority of superiors/officers and subordinates/ratings rate all safety 
factors as neutral. Interestingly, more superiors and officers rate the compliance as high than 
98 
 
subordinates and ratings on ships with high number of undesired events and accidents. The 
situation is reversed on ships with low number of undesired events and accidents, where more 
subordinates and ratings rate the compliance as high than superiors and officers. 
Table 3: Percent of low, neutral and high scores on safety factors in ships with low and high number of 
undesired events and accidents sorted on superiors/officers and subordinates/ratings. 
Number of undesired events and accidents Low High 
  
 
Low Neutral High Missing Low Neutral High Missing 
Undesired events 
        
 
Superiors/Officers 
        
  
Overall perceived safety status - 25.0 65.0 10.0 - 3.2 93.5 3.2 
  
Perceived safety compliance - 25.0 70.0 5.0 - 3.2 93.5 3.2 
  
Attitudes towards safety 12.5 40.0 47.5 - 12.9 38.7 48.4 - 
  
Perceived commitment to safety - 20.0 72.5 7.5 - 16.1 83.9 - 
 
Subordinates/Ratings 
        
  
Overall perceived safety status - 11.1 77.8 11.1 - 6.8 84.1 9.1 
  
Perceived safety compliance - 11.1 85.2 3.7 - 2.3 93.2 4.5 
  
Attitudes towards safety - 25.9 70.4 3.7 13.6 22.7 63.6 - 
  
Perceived commitment to safety - 25.9 70.4 3.7 - 31.8 61.4 6.8 
           
Accidents 
        
 
Superiors/Officers 
        
  
Overall perceived safety status - 27.0 62.2 10.8 - 2.9 94.1 2.9 
  
Perceived safety compliance - 21.6 73.0 5.4 - 8.8 88.2 2.9 
  
Attitudes towards safety 18.9 40.5 40.5 - 5.9 38.2 55.9 - 
  
Perceived commitment to safety - 24.3 67.6 8.1 - 11.8 88.2 - 
 
Subordinates/Ratings 
        
  
Overall perceived safety status - 3.6 92.9 3.6 - 11.6 74.4 14.0 
  
Perceived safety compliance - - 96.4 3.6 - 9.3 86.0 4.7 
  
Attitudes towards safety 7.1 32.1 60.7 - 9.3 18.6 69.8 2.3 
    Perceived commitment to safety - 17.9 82.1 - - 37.2 53.5 9.3 
 
nUDE, sup/off = 30-40; nUDE, sub/rat, = 24-44               
 
naccidents, sup/off = 33-37; naccidents, sub/rat = 27-42       
 
Table 4 show the Pearson‟s correlation between undesired events and accidents, and 
compliance, attitudes and commitment for superiors/officers and subordinates/ratings. 
Compliance is significantly correlated with undesired events for superiors and officers (r = 
.305, p < .05), along with accidents for superiors and officers (r = .269, p < .05). Attitudes (r = 
.217, p > .05) and commitment (r = .216, p > .05) also show a low, but not significant, 
correlation with accidents for superiors and officers. None of the correlations for subordinates 
and ratings are significant, but commitment and accidents show a low negative correlation (r 
= -.230, p > .05). 
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Table 4: Pearson‟s correlations between safety factors, undesired events and 
accidents sorted on superiors/officers and subordinated/ratings. 
  
Compliance Attitudes Commitment 
Undesired events Superiors/officers .305
*
 .006 .006 
 
Subordinates/ratings .082 -.045 -.093 
Accidents Superiors/officers .269
*
 .217 .216 
 
Subordinates/ratings -.060 .041 -.230 
nsup/off = 66-68; nsub/rat = 65-68 
* p < .05 
 
T-tests were performed in order to examine the differences in perceived overall safety status 
along with the individual safety factors between superiors/officers and subordinates/ratings. 
Table 5 below, show mean factor score for the two groups along with t. The ratings of the 
safety factors for the two groups were quite similar. Only compliance (t = -2.31, p < .05) and 
attitudes (t= -2.15, p < .05) turned out to be significantly higher for subordinates and ratings 
than superiors and officers. 
Table 5: T-tests on safety status, compliance, attitudes, and 
commitment between superiors/officers and subordinates/ratings. 
     
Mean st.dev t 
 
Safety status 
Sup/Off 3.79 .436 
-1.900 
 
Sub/Rat 3.93 .414 
 
Compliance 
Sup/Off 3.90 .477 
-2.310* 
 
Sub/Rat 4.08 .412 
 
Attitudes 
Sup/Off 3.45 .851 
-2.150* 
 
Sub/Rat 3.76 .868 
 
Commitment 
Sup/Off 3.92 .458 
1.157 
 
Sub/Rat 3.82 .595 
 nsup/off = 66-71; nsub/rat = 64-70 
 
* p < .05 
     
Testing the differences on ships with high and low number of undesired events showed few 
differences, shown in table 6. For superiors and officers, all safety factors were rated higher 
on ships with a high number of undesired events, except for commitment, which was rated the 
same on both types of ships with a little higher standard deviation for ships with high number 
of undesired events. Only compliance (t= -2.597, p < .05) was significantly higher for 
superiors and officers. When it comes to subordinates and ratings, even smaller differences 
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emerge. Overall safety status is rated equal on both types of ships with a slightly higher 
standard deviation on ships with low number of accidents. Compliance is rated somewhat 
higher on ships with high number of accidents, whilst attitudes and commitment is rated lower 
on ships with high number of accidents. None of the differences turned out to be significant. 
 
Table 6: T-tests on safety status, compliance, attitudes, and commitment 
between ship groups with low and high rate of undesired events, sorted 
on sample, superiors/officers and subordinates/ratings 
Undesired events 
    Ship group  Mean st.dev T 
Superiors and officers 
 
Safety status Low 3.72 .459 
-1.495 
  
High 3.88 .397 
 
Compliance Low 3.78 .504 
-2.597* 
  
High 4.07 .391 
 
Attitudes Low 3.44 .775 
-0.049 
  
High 3.45 .953 
 
Commitment Low 3.92 .481 
-0.052 
  
High 3.92 .436 
 
n = 30-40 
 
  
 
   
  
 Subordinates and ratings 
 
Safety status Low 3.93 .449 
-0.039 
  
High 3.93 .397 
 
Compliance Low 4.04 .506 
-0.666 
  
High 4.11 .345 
 
Attitudes Low 3.81 .707 
0.372 
  
High 3.73 .957 
 
Commitment Low 3.88 .557 
0.750 
   High 3.77 .621 
  n = 24-44 
 
* p < .05 
     
When examining the differences for superiors and officers between ships with a high and low 
number of accidents (table 7), all safety factors were rated higher on ships with high number 
of accidents. Only safety status (t= -2.821, p < .01) and compliance (t= -2.265, p < .05) 
however turned out to be significant. For subordinates and ratings, opposite tendencies 
appear. All safety factors except for attitudes were rated lower on ships with high number of 
accidents, although none of the differences were significant.  
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Table 7: T-tests on safety status, compliance, attitudes, and commitment 
between ship groups with low and high rate of accidents, sorted on 
sample, superiors/officers and subordinates/ratings 
Accidents 
    Ship group  Mean st.dev T 
Superiors and officers 
 
Safety status Low 3.64 .451 
-2.821** 
  
High 3.93 .374 
 
Compliance Low 3.78 .486 
-2.265* 
  
High 4.04 .437 
 
Attitudes Low 3.27 .867 
-1.847 
  
High 3.64 .801 
 
Commitment Low 3.82 .487 
-1.796 
  
High 4.02 .410 
 
n = 33-37 
 
  
 
   
  
 Subordinates and ratings 
 
Safety status Low 3.99 .420 
1.060 
  
High 3.88 .409 
 
Compliance Low 4.11 .398 
0.488 
  
High 4.06 .425 
 
Attitudes Low 3.71 .874 
-0.335 
  
High 3.79 .874 
 
Commitment Low 3.98 .566 
1.904 
  
High 3.70 .596 
  n = 27-42 
 
* p < .05; ** p < .01 
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Discussion 
This article aims to investigate the associations between safety status and undesired events 
and accidents. Significant correlations were found between compliance and both undesired 
events and accidents, but only for superiors and officers. In addition, this correlation was 
positive, showing that higher levels of compliance correlate with higher levels of undesired 
events and accidents. This would seem counterintuitive as one could expect ships with high 
level of compliance to have less unsafe behavior and hence less undesired events and 
accidents. The opposite however could be just as likely considering the delay between the 
data on undesired events and accidents, and the questionnaire data. Ships having high 
numbers of undesired events and accidents could have motivated the sailors to pay extra 
attention to safety, or management could have intervened with safety initiatives in an attempt 
to improve upon the safety performance. As this study was unable to obtain data on such 
initiatives, this can only be hypothesized upon. Interestingly however, are the differences 
between superiors/officers and subordinates ratings, where subordinates and ratings show 
little correlation between undesired events and accidents, and compliance. A superior or 
officer may attempt to have subordinates and ratings comply with rules and regulations – but 
as subordinates and ratings are the ones who do most of the labor, their perceptions of 
compliance on board a ship may be more accurate than that of superiors and officers. Testing 
the differences in safety status between superiors/officers and subordinates/ratings show 
similar results. Significant differences were found in compliance and attitudes, resulting in 
partial support for H4. These differences between superiors/officers and subordinates/ratings 
become more clear when differences in the safety factors were tested on ships with high and 
low number of undesired events and accidents.  
The results from comparing ships with high and low number of undesired events showed 
superiors and officers constantly rating ships with high number of undesired events as higher 
on all safety factors, except for commitment which were rated as the same on both ships. Only 
compliance, however, turned out to be significantly higher. Subordinates and ratings rate 
attitudes and commitment higher on ships with low number of undesired events, and rate 
compliance lower on ships with low number of undesired events, but none of them were 
significant.  
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Comparing ships with high and low number of accidents, the results seem to somewhat mirror 
those of undesired events and accidents. Superiors and officers rate all safety factors as higher 
on ships with high number of accidents, with over all safety status and compliance being 
significant. Subordinates and ratings rate all safety factors higher on ships with low number of 
accidents except for attitudes, but again; none of the differences were significant.  
This do not support hypothesis 1, 2 and 3. The significant differences found in superiors and 
officers contradict the predictions. Even though the results from subordinates and ratings 
indicate the expected results, none were significant. A possible explanation could be the 
convergent validity between the safety status used in the present study, and the safety culture 
constructs used in the presented theory supporting the predictions. The results however could 
indicate that subordinates and ratings could have a more accurate depiction of the actual 
safety status on board the ships. For superiors and officers, safety will always be a priority 
and will probably be reflected in their compliance, attitudes, and commitment, and possibly 
even stronger if they observe many undesired events and accidents on board the ship – and no 
matter how dedicated the superiors or officers are to safety, it is ultimately the one who does 
the work who will be deciding in which manner they will complete the task ahead. 
Methodological challenges 
Several limitations arise in this study. As some ships and shipping companies tend to have 
ratings recruited from countries with low-salary workforce like the Philippines, and officers 
from western countries (Norway and India in this sample).The differences between 
superiors/officers and subordinates/ratings may have been affected by nationality culture. This 
could emphasize differences between the two groups. National culture has also been found to 
have an effect on response styles (Silverthorne, 2005). Even though the distribution of 
superiors/officers and subordinates/ratings were fairly good, the sample size were also not 
optimal. 
The delay between data on undesired events and accidents and the questionnaire data could 
result in the two data sets not being related as closely as they could. There could have been 
initiatives taken on board the ships to improve upon safety, and as this study were unable to 
obtain such data, this could be a confounding variable in the present study. A longitudinal 
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study with multiple measurements would be able examine the associations between undesired 
events, accidents and safety status, more in depth compared to a cross-sectional study. 
Conclusion 
Keeping the limitations in mind, the results show interesting differences between 
superiors/officers and subordinates/ratings in their perception of compliance, attitudes and 
commitment. Results indicate subordinates and ratings having a more accurate depiction of 
safety status on board the ships, and it could be that future safety culture assessments should 
primarily focus on this group in order to get the most accurate measurement. Further 
examination is however required before any conclusion can be made. 
Being able to create an accepted causal model of safety culture and safety performance, 
including occupational injuries and accidents, would be a major advancement in safety 
research and could benefit companies with hazardous work environments. Such a model could 
be used to direct safety improvement initiatives, and help make the work environment safer. 
Even though little association between compliance, attitudes and commitment were found in 
this study, substantial findings from earlier studies support such an association. It is therefore 
likely that a more comprehensive design could yield more explicit results.  
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Appendix 
A: Factor loadings, internal consistency and average item-total correlation 
Pattern Matrix
a
 
   
Safety status
 
Component 
   
1 2 3 
   
SAFETY - Compliance - A30 - When I enter a new ship I always 
receive a proper hand-over 
.73 -.30 .02 
   
SAFETY - Compliance - A33 - Accidents and near-misses are 
always reported according to company orders .73 .06 -.13    
SAFETY - Compliance - A32 - Task assignments are always 
crosschecked and verified 
.71 .13 -.15 
   
SAFETY - Compliance - A34 - Senior ship‟s management 
ensures full cooperation between all on board departments .60 .11 .10    
SAFETY - Compliance - A29 - Emergency drills are conducted as 
prescribed 
.59 -.09 .28 
   
SAFETY - Compliance - A25 - Leaders make sure that relevant 
operational intentions and actions are understood .51 .21 .15    
SAFETY - Attitudes - A16 - [Reversed]Getting a permit to do a 
job is a waste of time 
-.20 .84 .23 
   
SAFETY - Attitudes - A17 - [Reversed]Checklists are sometimes 
unnecessary. because it is just common sense .08 .80 -.01    
SAFETY - Attitudes - A15 - [Reversed]Risk assessment is 
sometimes unnecessary. even though it is required 
.06 .80 -.24 
   
SAFETY - Commitment - A21 - My suggestions about safety will 
be acted upon if I express them to management on shore -.03 -.22 .81    
SAFETY - Commitment - A27 - My suggestions about safety will 
be acted upon if I express them to senior officers on board 
.00 .08 .76 
   
SAFETY - Commitment - A20 - I am encouraged by my seniors 
to report any unsafe conditions I may observe .08 .28 .54    
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Pattern Matrix
a
 
Job satisfaction
 
Component 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
JOBSAT - Reward&Benefits - I13 - The amount of pay I receive .94 -.18 -.02 .02 -.10 .08 
JOBSAT - Reward&Benefits - I19 - The benefits the company 
offers me 
.83 .10 -.02 .06 -.07 -.06 
JOBSAT - Reward&Benefits - I14 - The opportunities the 
shipping company provides for furthering my education 
.78 .13 -.01 -.09 -.06 -.17 
JOBSAT - Reward&Benefits - I22 - The rewards I receive .76 -.12 .04 .05 .15 .07 
JOBSAT - Reward&Benefits - I12 - My chances for a promotion .47 .19 .05 -.15 .19 .08 
JOBSAT - Co-workers - I15 - The communication I have with the 
employees in other departments 
.00 .95 -.16 .01 -.00 -.02 
JOBSAT - Co-workers - I16 - The communication I have with the 
people on board the ship -.10 .94 .01 .01 -.01 -.01 
JOBSAT - Co-workers - I18 - The way I am treated on board the 
ship 
.04 .84 .04 -.06 .01 .10 
JOBSAT - Co-workers - I17 - The competence of my co-workers .05 .58 .24 .19 -.06 -.00 
JOBSAT - Task - I5 - The respect my co-workers have for my 
work 
-.01 -.06 .92 .07 -.08 .01 
JOBSAT - Task - I6 - The possibilities for variation -.04 -.09 .80 -.02 .10 .09 
JOBSAT - Task - I4 - The use of my competence -.04 .13 .78 -.01 .01 -.07 
JOBSAT - Task - I10 - The opportunity to develop new 
competence in my work .09 -.01 .78 .00 .02 -.08 
JOBSAT - Meaningfullness - J2 - [Reversed]I often receive tasks 
I perceive as meaningless 
-.00 -.11 .12 .87 -.13 .10 
JOBSAT - Meaningfullness - J3 - [Reversed]I do a lot of work 
that should be done by others .00 .13 -.07 .77 .05 .08 
JOBSAT - Meaningfullness - J4 - [Reversed]Rules or procedures 
make my job difficult 
-.04 .09 -.03 .59 .21 -.20 
JOBSAT - Worry - I3 - Deadlines given to me -.13 .01 .05 -.05 .88 .00 
JOBSAT - Worry - I21 - The amount of paperwork I do .09 -.17 -.10 .24 .70 -.04 
JOBSAT - Worry - I23 - The quality of my sleep at night .11 .15 .08 -.12 .54 .07 
JOBSAT - FeelingOfSafety - J6 - If a crisis should occur, I'm 
confident my co-workers could handle it .06 .08 -.09 .20 -.06 .83 
JOBSAT - FeelingOfSafety - J5 - I don't worry about losing my 
job 
-.07 -.01 .06 -.14 .07 .78 
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Pattern Matrix
a
 
Stress
 
Component 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
STRESS - Responsebility&Decisions - F22 - Having to make 
decisions in situations where decisions are hard to make 
.87 -.05 -.03 .00 .05 -.02 
STRESS - Responsebility&Decisions - F21 - Having to make 
decisions too quickly .85 .03 .04 -.09 -.11 -.09 
STRESS - Responsebility&Decisions - F23 - Doing tasks that 
require complete concentration without having the necessary time 
.81 .02 -.06 .03 -.01 -.02 
STRESS - Responsebility&Decisions - F20 - An uncomfortable 
high amount of responsibility .66 .02 .03 .07 .08 .21 
STRESS - WorkStrain - F2 - Very high work pace -.05 .94 .03 -.08 -.08 .00 
STRESS - WorkStrain - F3 - Very high work load -.03 .93 -.00 -.05 -.00 .07 
STRESS - WorkStrain - F1 - Shift work with uncomfortable 
watches 
-.03 .68 -.10 .21 .11 .08 
STRESS - WorkStrain - F25 - Being interrupted in my work .23 .58 .07 -.00 .02 -.16 
STRESS - PhysicalNuisance - F13 - Disturbing vibrations from 
the ship 
-.04 -.04 .94 .11 -.02 -.06 
STRESS - PhysicalNuisance - F12 - Disturbing noise from the 
ship 
-.06 .10 .90 -.04 .04 -.09 
STRESS - PhysicalNuisance - F14 - Too extreme temperature 
(heat or cold) on board the ship 
.10 -.07 .76 -.05 .00 .21 
STRESS - HighRiskTasks - F30 - Doing a task were an error 
could result in co-workers being hurt 
.04 -.05 .00 .96 .02 -.01 
STRESS - HighRiskTasks - F31 - Doing a task were an error 
could result in financial loss for the company -.05 .05 .03 .96 -.06 -.00 
STRESS - Isolation - F10 - Difficulty staying in contact with 
family and friends at home 
-.07 -.00 .03 -.09 .93 .08 
STRESS - Isolation - F11 - Lack of information about the world 
outside the ship (e.g. News and world events) .06 -.00 -.01 .05 .90 -.12 
STRESS - Variation - F4 - Very little variation in the work -.01 .03 .01 -.01 -.03 .96 
 
      
Pattern Matrix
a
 
   
Working conditions
 
Component 
   
1 2 3 
   
WORKCOND - MonetaryLoyalty - B6 - My high salary is the 
only reason I continue in this job .91 -.09 .10    
WORKCOND - MonetaryLoyalty - B13 - The need to support my 
family is the only reason I have this job 
.81 .10 -.10 
   
WORKCOND - Goodwill - B14 - It is OK for me to extend the on 
board sailing period or contract if the shipping company sees the 
need for it 
.06 .85 -.07 
   
WORKCOND - Goodwill - B11 - I have great loyalty to the 
shipping company -.06 .82 .10    
WORKCOND - IntentToLeave - B9 - [Reversed] If I had the 
opportunity to work in the offshore oil industry I would accept it 
.13 .00 .88 
   
WORKCOND - IntentToLeave - B8 - [Reversed] If I recieved 
another job offer on land I would quit immediately -.13 .03 .78    
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Component Matrix
a
 
     
Goals 
 
Comp. 
     
1 
     
GOALS - CaredFor - A7 - [Reversed] The shipping company only 
sees economy and numbers, and not the people 
.74 
     
GOALS - CaredFor - A6 - [Reversed] We have to fight for every 
request we make to the shipping company .73      
GOALS - CaredFor - A4 - [Reversed] The shipping company 
won‟t give us equipment that would make work easier .70      
GOALS - CaredFor - A5 - [Reversed] The shipping company puts 
profit ahead of safety .66      
GOALS - CaredFor - C28 - [Reversed] Ship management 
prioritize profits ahead of peoples well-being 
.66 
     
GOALS - CaredFor - A8 - [Reversed] There are too few people 
working on board my ship .60      
 
      
Pattern Matrix
a
 
  
Relationship with co-workers
 
Component 
  
1 2 3 4 
  
RELCOW - Oppenness - C16 - I always welcome new persons in 
my department .85 -.03 .07 -.07   
RELCOW - Oppenness - C19 - I regard my co-workers as friends .75 .02 .08 -.11 
  
RELCOW - Oppenness - C9 - If someone should feel the need to 
talk about their problems, I always take the time to listen 
.75 -.06 .00 .07 
  
RELCOW - Oppenness - C23 - I always tell people when they 
have done a good job .61 .05 -.21 .14   
RELCOW - SocialGrouping - C14 - [Reversed] I only socialize 
with people from my own department -.06 .92 -.04 .07   
RELCOW - SocialGrouping - C15 - [Reversed] I don‟t like to 
socialize with people from other departments .04 .88 .08 -.10   
RELCOW - OpennessCrossGender - C3 - [Reversed] Problems 
often arise because men and women work together -.08 -.02 .92 -.02   
RELCOW - OpennessCrossGender - C4 - [Reversed] I am not 
comfortable working with people of the opposite gender 
.09 .05 .78 .10 
  
RELCOW - EmotionalInvolvement - C6 - [Reversed] I never ask 
my co-workers about family related problems -.05 -.14 .09 .92   
RELCOW - EmotionalInvolvement - C5 - [Reversed] I never ask 
co-workers about their job related problems .07 .17 -.03 .78   
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Pattern Matrix
a
 
    
Relationship with superiors
 
Component 
    
1 2 
    
RELSUP - Commitment - D4 - My superiors always take action 
on suggestions from me and my co-workers 
.83 -.07 
    
RELSUP - Commitment - D7 - I feel that my direct superiors 
always take my comments and suggestions seriously .78 -.09     
RELSUP - Commitment - D2 - My direct superiors are good role 
models 
.74 .14 
    
RELSUP - Commitment - D12 - My direct superiors always give 
a clear answer, I never doubt where they stand .74 .00     
RELSUP - Commitment - D1 - I feel appreciated by my direct 
superiors 
.69 .06 
    
RELSUP - Trust - D20 - I am comfortable asking my direct 
superiors if I don‟t understand what I am supposed to do -.30 .95     
RELSUP - Trust - D30 - I am given trust from my direct superiors .17 .73 
    
RELSUP - Trust - D29 - My direct superiors are highly competent .17 .67 
    
RELSUP - Trust - D6 - My direct superiors are availiable when I 
need them .18 .55     
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Internal consistency and average item-total correlation 
      α  
Average inter-
item correlation  Items  
Safety status   .785  .44  12 
 
Compliance  .743  .49  6 
 
Attitudes  .759  .60  3 
 
Commitment   .568  .39  3 
Job satisfaction  
   
 
Rewards and benefits  .827  .63  5 
 
Co-workers   .871  .73  4 
 
Task  .840  .68  4 
 
Meaningfulness   .702  .52  3 
 
Worry  .573  .39  3 
 
Feeling of safety  .501  .34  2 
Stress  
   
 
Resp. & decisions   .810  .63  4 
 
Work strain  .815  .64  4 
 
Physical nuisance   .841  .71  3 
 
High risk tasks  .919  .85  2 
 
Isolation   .797  .66  2 
   Variation   -  -  1 
Working conditions  
   
 
Monetary loyalty  .658  .49  2 
 
Goodwill   .564  .86  2 
 
Intent to leave   .551  .39  2 
Goals  
   
 
Feeling cared for   .768  .51  6 
Relationship with co-workers  
   
 
Openness  .714  .51  4 
 
Social grouping   .770  .63  2 
 
Working with opposite gender  .709  .55  2 
 
Emotional involvement   .683  .52  2 
Relationship with superiors  
   
 
Commitment  .817  .61  5 
 
Trust  .748  .55  4 
N 
 
207-215 
  Likert-scale range 1-5 
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B: Correlation between factors in the questionnaire 
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C: The questionnaire 
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